The Cresset (Vol. L, No. 9) by Valparaiso University
Valparaiso University 
ValpoScholar 
The Cresset (archived issues) 
10-1987 
The Cresset (Vol. L, No. 9) 
Valparaiso University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/cresset_archive 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public 
Administration Commons 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
The Cresset (archived issues) by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please 
contact a ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 

CRESSET 
ROBERT V. SCHNABEL, Publisher 
JAMES NUECHTERLEIN, Editor 
Contributors 
3 The Editor I IN LUCE TUA 
5 Mark Schwehn I BLOOM IN LOVE 
11 Fredrick Barton I ROWING TO SWEDEN 
16 Martha M. Vertreace I SHAMAN (Verse) 
17 Linda Ferguson I OF WORTH & WORRY . . .. . 
Valparaiso University 
Valparaiso, Indiana 46383 
OCTOBER, 1987 Vol. L, No. 9 
ISSN 0011-1198 
18 Richarcf ·M apJJIJ.l. t P J\1~. SONGS 
20 P~l:Ji~"ilri~;zk: •I Mi;NUQLEAR SUMMER VACATION . . . . . .. 
25 ~;,"steven Paul 1 •• ~ ~~~·r. IT PLAY IN NEW YORK? 
27.:~~ymond P. F~r-:f DMLOC;UE OF AN AGED COUPLE AT SORRENTO (Verse) ... · . ... . . ·.•. ·. . .. ·. 
2&: :Walter Ke_lli~'I':•HQW:"J)o LU'fJ;tERANS READ THE BIBLE? . . . . . . . .. 
32· ·not N~·k;le~ ··l:itf.ACTIONS: . . . . . . . . . . . · ... : ·. ·. .. . ·.·. . . ... . . .. . . . ... · . . . . 
Depa~t~tl Editors . . . . . ... . . . 
Jill BaumgaWt~ ~Pot~ Editor 
Richard H. W. Brauer, Art Editor 











Wilbur H. Hutchins, Finance 
Betty Wagner, Administration and Circulation 
THE CRESSET is published monthly during the academic year, 
September through May, by the Valparaiso University Press as a 
forum for ideas and informed opinion. The views expressed are 
those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the preponder-
ance of opinion at Valparaiso University. Manuscripts should be 
addressed to the Editor and accompanied by return postage. Let-
ters to the Editor for publication are subject to editing for brev-
ity. The Book Review Index and the American Humanities Index list 
Cresset reviews. Second class postage paid at Valparaiso, Indiana. 
Regular subscription rates: one year-$8.50; two years-$14.75; 
single copy-$1.25. Student subscription rates: one year-$4.00; 
single copy-$. 75. Entire contents copyrighted 1987 by the Val-
paraiso University Press, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383, without 
whose written permission reproduction in whole or in part for 
any purpose whatsoever is expressly forbidden. 
2 
Above: Sadao Watanabe, Japanese, b. 1913, The 
Boat in the Storm (Luke 8:22-25), 1981, katazome 
stencil dyed print, 791100, Valparaiso University 
Museum of Art. Gift of Josephine and Byron Fer-
guson. 
Cover: Sadao Watanabe, Japanese, b. 1913, The Last 
Supper (Matthew 26:26-29), 1985, katazome stencil 
dyed print, 1001100, Valparaiso University Museum 
of Art. Gift of the Friends of Art, VUMA. 
These prints were purchased and given to the 
VUMA this summer when Valparaiso University 
awarded Sadao Watanabe the honorary degree of 
Doctor of Arts. 
The Cresset 
IN LUCE TUA 
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor 
Reflections on the Papal Visit 
The pope's visit to America last month is very old 
news by now, and it has been analyzed to the point of 
intellectual stupefaction. But it still bears thinking 
about for what it reveals about our present cultural 
condition. 
One of the things it reveals--or rather reminds us 
of-is the unfathomable reaches of fatuity and triviali-
zation the American media are capable of when they 
engage theological matters. Much of the coverage of 
the pope himself came down to the conclusion that he 
is a very nice-perhaps even charismatic-man who 
unfortunately holds some very peculiar views about re-
ligious faith and life. Why, one was led to wonder, 
would such a genial and charming soul (and who is so 
good with children) cling to such retrograde theologi-
cal and social opinions? As for the divisions within 
American Catholicism, they were most of the time re-
duced to the all-purpose formula for such matters, en-
lightenment vs. obscurantism: the church, which be-
fore Vatican II was dogmatic and authoritarian, has 
since struggled to become open and tolerant Uust like 
the Protestants) but is being held back by reactionaries 
in the Vatican. 
Television, as usual, easily outdid the other media in 
superficiality. Most TV reporters covered the visit 
much like a political campaign trip, assessing the 
pope's significance in terms of crowd estimates and 
poll ratings and speaking of him as if he were the 
ecclesiastical equivalent of Ronald Reagan: would his 
personal popularity be enough to overcome popular 
disagreement with him on the "issues"? Coverage of 
those issues also followed the standard inanities of the 
political model: achieve "balance" by alternating be-
tween extremists (one radical nun for every Tridentine 
traditionalist) and then bring in a mildly liberal fol-
lower of the via media (Cardinal Bernardin, perhaps) 
for a moderate wrap-up. It wasn't all that bad, of 
course, but it was bad enough often enough to make 
one despair of the ability of American popular TV 
ever to do justice to serious religious subjects. 
But we don't need a papal visit to instruct us in the 
inadequacy of the media to provide intellectual sub-
stance. The more serious cultural revelation offered by 
the pope's visit gets to the matter of fundamental na-
tional values and to certain contradictions in the mod-
ern American psyche. 
Everywhere one turns today, one runs into alarmed 
discussion of a supposed crisis in moral values oc-
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casioned by a modern decline into relativism. We have 
lost, it is said, our moral anchors; in place of the clear 
enjoinders and prohibitions of the past we have man-
uevered ourselves into endless moral equivocations 
where everything is perennially up for grabs and noth-
ing can be decreed for certain. In such an atmosphere, 
we inevitably drift into a kind of do-it-yourself moral-
ity that, for all its convenience for 'short-term gratifica-
tion, leaves us emotionally unsatisfied and morally at 
sea. 
Much of the coverage of the pope 
himself came down to the conclusion 
that he is a very nice-perhaps even 
charismatic-man who unfortunately 
holds some peculiar religious views. 
The theme of morality lost is of course a staple of 
the conservative imagination, which tends to an often 
romanticized vision of the moral plateau whose heights 
we have forsaken and a frequently exaggerated sense 
of the depths into which we have declined. T he con-
servative's paradise lost is often a paradise that never 
was. Yet the recent reaction against relativism and the 
concomitant search for stable and perduring values 
has not been restricted to conservatives; it has become 
a common theme of our culture. Everyone-left, right, 
and center-is into values, and people everywhere in-
dicate rhetorical longings for a value system embedded 
in something more substantial than personal predilec-
tions and errant enthusiasms. The popularity of works 
of cultural criticism like Allan Bloom's The Closing of 
the American Mind (see Mark Schwehn's critique else-
where in these pages) can be traced in no small part 
to their withering criticism of moral relativism and 
their austere insistence on high and permanent ethical 
standards. 
Yet when someone like the pope comes along, offer-
ing us a precise set of values and a belief system in 
which those values might enduringly be set, we back 
off; indeed, we resist. And not just those who do not 
share the theological or ecclesiastical commitments out 
of which the pope speaks. Christians in general and 
Catholics in particular, confronted by the pope's se-
vere demands, react with the affronted vocabulary of 
American liberal individualism. Who is the pope-
what is the church-to tell us what we should believe 
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or how we should act? All of a sudden we are insistent 
pluralists again, demanding our rights to set our own 
moral paths by our own moral lights , resentful of any 
person or any tradition that would presume to estab-
lish authoritative and binding moral guidelines. 
It all seems very perverse, and in part it is. The 
pope's moral seriousness exposes our moral evasions. 
We tell ourselves that we want solid moral values, but 
in fact we do not--or at least we do not want the 
moral disciplines those values imply. We want desper-
ately to feel good, or at least better, about ourselves 
and we sense that that will require an escape from 
moral solipsism, yet we refuse to be held liable to the 
objective requirements of the Christian (or any other) 
tradition and justify that refusal in the name of moral 
freedom. The young Augustine asked to be made vir-
tuous but not just yet; we ask to be made virtuous but 
only on our own terms. 
But things are not quite that simple and the prob-
lem is more than one of human perversity. Not all 
those within the Catholic church who resist the pope's 
moral strictures have given in to moral anarchy or the 
siren-songs of American ethical individualism. There 
are dissidents and dissidents; some are simply chronic 
rebels, but others have thoughtful reasons to give for 
the reservations they raise concerning papal decrees . 
If it is the temptation of the laity to demand a moral 
freedom that orthodoxy cannot rightly allow, it is the 
temptation of the hierarchy to demand a standard of 
obedience that orthodoxy does not necessarily require. 
At the heart of Catholic moral teaching lies the con-
cept of the natural law, which presupposes an objec-
tive order of right and truth that exists independently 
of our perception of it, but which is accessible both by 
inclination and by reason. Radical philosophical mod-
ernity would deny the concept itself, and so must be 
rejected by Catholic--or other Christian--orthodoxy. 
But a more modest modernity may be heeded, that 
which brings into question not the existence of truth 
but the possibilities of our comprehensive apprehen-
sion of it. Modernity need not reduce us to skepticism, 
but it should induce in us a certain humility. 
It is hardly the place of non-Catholics to presume to 
instruct Rome on the workings of its magisterium, but 
many faithful sons and daughters of the church have 
themselves raised questions as to the moral prudence 
of the hierarchy insisting as forcefully as it recently 
has on obedience in hard cases. The pope has rightly 
noted that it has never been easy for Christians to fol-
low the full "truths of the gospel," but surely the his-
tory of the church is replete with examples of over-
specifications, later quietly discarded, of what those 
truths consist of. 
One cannot reasonably expect (nor would one want) 
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the church to reverse itself, or even retreat to a dis-
creet silence, on such fundamental moral questions as 
abortion or homosexual behavior; reversals there 
would have the effect of dismantling the natural law 
tradition itself. Yet one wonders if such a matter as ar-
tificial birth control must necessarily fall into the same 
category. On that question the disavowal and disre-
garding of the church's official teaching has by no 
means been restricted to extremists, habitual dissen-
ters, or moral latitudinarians. What appears to have 
occurred, rather, is a genuine and profound shift in 
the sensus fidelium (the sense of the faithful) on the 
ISSUe . 
If it is the temptation of the laity 
to demand a moral freedom that 
orthodoxy cannot rightly allow, it is 
the temptation of the hierarchy to 
demand a standard of obedience that 
orthodoxy does not strictly require. 
It is awkward and presumptious for non-Catholic 
Christians to address themselves to these matters, and 
we venture to do so here only because of the great re-
gard we have for the essential message and mission of 
the pope and of the church of which he is chief 
bishop. Rome is the ally of faithful Christians 
everywhere, and whatever weakens Catholicism 
weakens all who go by the name of Christ. We need 
the Catholic church's reminder to heedless liberals that 
in following the dictates of conscience we must first of 
all ensure that our consciences have been rightly in-
structed. We need as well the disciplines of the natural 
law tradition with its compelling repudiation of moral 
relativism. 
But those who would proclaim authoritatively have 
the responsibility of exercising their moral authority 
with prudence and restraint, and of not presuming to 
know more than can plausibly be claimed about the 
application of general principles to particular situa-
tions. Those who have the care of souls are right to 
insist that we can't simply make up our own moral 
rules as we go along, but they need to make certain 
that they not impose upon us a superfluity of moral 
burdens. American culture's permanent susceptibility 
to antinomianism won't be cured by an alien au-
thoritarianism. The pope is right to want to call Amer-
icans to a more serious moral life, and he strikes a re-
sponsive chord in many of us when he does so, but we 
will only respond fully to those calls of authority to 
which we can give credible assent. Cl 
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BLOOM IN LOVE 
A Critical Reading of The Closing of the American Mind 
Sometime during the 1940s Allan Bloom fell in love 
with the University of Chicago. Or, in his own words 
from his book The Closing of the American Mind, he fell 
in love "with the idea of the university" (245). Or 
again perhaps he fell in love at that time with learning 
or wisdom, for, as he reminds us, the university "is 
after all only a vehicle for contents in principle separ-
able from it" (245). 
Did Bloom then fall in love with a particular place, 
a place to which he has now happily returned as a 
professor in the Committee on Social Thought? And 
did this love lead him in Platonic fashion first to a love 
of the idea of the university and then to a love of wis-
dom? Or are these various objects-an institution, an 
idea, and a way of life-somehow confused in Bloom's 
mind? And what of the quality and the depth of the 
love Bloom feels for any or all of these things? 
Why, we might wonder, should the course and char-
acter of a particular professor's passions concern us at 
all? The Closing of the American Mind has been for some 
time now a best-selling book that addresses weighty 
matters of public concern. Its surprising popularity at-
tests, I think, to the hunger for informed thought 
about what is widely perceived to be an educational 
crisis in this country. 
The period of official reports and commissioned 
studies has passed. And we now have before us a 
number of books that seem to hold out the promise of 
more thoroughgoing and well-reasoned diagnoses of 
our present ills as well as some well-considered mea-
sures for remedying them. What E. D. Hirsch has 
sought to do for the state of elementary and secondary 
education in his Cultural Literacy (another best seller), 
Bloom proposes to do for the state of higher learning 
in the United States. Bloom's book, however, precisely 
because of the flawed character of the passion that 
Mark Schwehn teaches in Christ College at Valparaiso Uni-
versity. He is a frequent contributor to The Cresset. 
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governs it, should deeply disappoint all friends of lib-
eral education. 
As Bloom himself tells us, "a virtue governs a pas-
sion, as moderation governs lust, or courage governs 
fear" (129), so it seems strange to say that passion gov-
erns Bloom's own book. Strange but true. This is dis-
appointing rather than merely irritating, because 
Bloom could have taught us a great deal about liberal 
learning and its fate in the United States: much of his 
book gives evidence of that potential. But Bloom's wis-
dom about such matters is overwhelmed by such an 
array of passions-rage, indignation, contempt, 
hatred, resentment-that the reader must maintain a 
level of inhuman self-control in order to profit from 
it. 
And these passions are invariably those of the disap-
pointed lover, of one trapped in the state of "love's 
mad self-forgetting" (I22) who has grown, given the 
flawed character of that love, to despise much of what 
he once loved in order to soothe his f~elings of rejec-
tion. The university failed Bloom, not Bloom the uni-
versity. So we get an account (this is Bloom's subtitle) 
of "how higher education has failed democracy and 
impoverished the souls of today's students." 
II 
Bloom does not deliver the account that he prom-
ises. In his judgment, the souls of today's students are 
so shrunken and deformed that it is inconceivable that 
anyone or anything, least of all the university by any 
description, could further impoverish them. The first 
third of The Closing of the American Mind, entitled "Stu-
dents," characterizes today's young people as virtually 
uneducable. Because they have not been nourished on 
great books, they come to college without "that refine-
ment of the mind's eye that permits it to see the deli-
cate distinctions among men, among their deeds and 
their motives" (61). 
There are other art forms, of course, but these 
Bloom dismisses with a series of contemptuous and 
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sweeping pronouncements. "Films . . . with serious 
pretentions have become intolerably ignorant and 
manipulative" (64). So much for the wonder of E. T. 
and the nobility of Chariots of Fire, not to speak of 
many other and better films for children and young 
adults. Music, but only rock music, is "the youth cul-
ture," all rock music reduces to Mick Jaggerism, and 
Mick Jaggerism creates the typical thirteen-year-old 
"whose body throbs with orgasmic rhythms; whose 
feelings are made articulate in hymns to the joys of 
onanism or the killing of parents; whose ambition is to 
win fame and wealth in imitating the drag-queen who 
makes the music. In short, life is made into a nonstop, 
commercially prepackaged masturbational fantasy" 
(75). 
Bloom's passions imperil the reader's 
capacity to reason with him. He is 
too often the negative image of what 
he holds up before us as the ideal of 
the liberally-educated human being. 
What are friends of liberal education to do with 
such cranky characterizations of "today's students"? 
We might try to extract from Bloom's text what is well 
considered and well tempered. So, for example, we 
might wonder with him about "whether the experience 
of the greatest texts from early childhood is not a pre-
requisite for a concern throughout life for them and 
for lesser but important literature" (62). The answer to 
this question is in my own mind by no means certain, 
but the question is worth considering anew, with in-
struction from some of Bloom's discussion and from 
other sources that impinge in various ways upon it. I 
am thinking here of such books as Hirsch's Cultural 
Literacy and Frye's The Educated Imagination. 
Bloom, however, seems determined to make even 
this enterprise difficult, for just as the reader is about 
to engage Bloom's thinking, he launches into an impas-
sioned diatribe. Thus, for example, he settles the 
reader into his argument about the importance of an 
early digestion of substantial intellectual fare, and he 
then suddenly announces, with a categorical self-assur-
ance that is typical, "The latest enemy of the vitality of 
classic texts is feminism" (65). This is simply false. 
Some feminists may drain the classic texts of their vital-
ity, as may some Marxists, some Platonists, and a few 
Rotarians. But the intellectual enterprises that have 
arisen from feminism per se have commonly displayed 
one of two constructive attitudes toward the classics. 
There has been much carefully-reasoned argument 
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for enlarging the canon of the Great Books (seldom 
for subtracting from it), a project that Bloom himself, 
perhaps in an unguarded moment, finds unobjection-
able (344). But there has more often been a range of 
efforts, featuring a normal rate of success and failure, 
to revitalize the classic texts by approaching them with 
a new set of questions and interp etative skills. Thus, 
when Phyllis Trible asks her~elf what really is the 
teaching of Genesis 2:4b-3:24 about human sexuality, 
her inquiry prompts her to write a very incisive in-
terpretation of that classic creation story as a chapter 
of her God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality. Again, Bloom's 
passions imperil the reader's capacity to reason with 
him. He is altogether too frequently the negative 
image of what he holds up before us as the ideal of 
the liberally-educated human being. 
Friends of liberal learning might pursue another 
and more fruitful line of inquiry in view of Bloom's 
characterization (really caricature) of "today's stu-
dents." Suppose that Bloom is right: suppose today's 
students really are unable to recognize, much less ap-
preciate, excellence, deafened by orgiastic music, and 
incapable of love. Why try to teach them? 
Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, was firm and 
clear about this matter. The teaching of political sci-
ence, which was, for him, the architectonic science that 
investigated all of the questions that Bloom quite 
properly believes to be at the center of a liberal educa-
tion, was, Aristotle believed, utterly wasted on the 
young. For, "since the young man tends to follow his 
passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable .. . . 
And it makes no difference whether he is young in 
years or youthful in character; the defect does not de-
pend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each 
successive object, as passion directs." 
The danger in Bloom's fulminations against today's 
students stems from the passion behind them, a pas-
sion that in turn panders to a mood that overtakes all 
of us in higher education from time to time. The vir-
tue of Aristotle's restrained and direct statement of the 
issue is that it forces the friends of liberal education 
to examine themselves, to see how seriously they really 
take their own occasionally-despairing judgments 
about the young, and to consider the implications of 
those judgments for the ways in which they have cho-
sen to live and learn and teach. Which one of us has 
not voiced sentiments very similar to Bloom's about 
several of our students' lack of wonder about the 
world, their apparent indifference in the presence of 
high and excellent things, their sordid and confused 
longings, and their strange tastes for noise as opposed 
to music? 
Bloom takes these commonplace observations and 
ordinary frustrations, dresses them up in portentous 
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phrases, and offers them to us as definitive cultural 
pronouncements. Aristotle, with great verbal economy 
and with no interest in merely inflaming our irrita-
tions, forces us to wonder about what should be taught 
to whom at what time. Aristotle provokes questioning; 
Bloom, in his discussion of today's students, merely 
provokes. 
III 
He apparently pro.vokes himself even more than he 
provokes his readers, for he is so busy heaping scorn 
upon students that he eventually argues against his 
own thesis, namely that the university has im-
poverished their souls. The third section of his book, 
in which Bloom analyzes and traces historically what 
he takes to be the intellectual corruption of the mod-
ern university, reaches its climax in a brief chapter 
that is simply entitled "The Sixties." The reader, 
mindful of Bloom's thesis and perhaps persuaded by 
at least a significant portion of Bloom's philosophical 
critique of the university, fully expects to find in this 
culminating chapter an explanation of the student dis-
orders of the 1960s in terms of the impoverishing ef-
fect that the university had upon them. Nothing of the 
kind emerges. Instead, we learn that the students 
ruined the university. 
This incoherent conclusion is as revealing as it is 
surprising. It reveals the source of Bloom's deep and 
lasting antipathy to students, for they, in his judgment, 
"declared [the university] bankrupt and thereby bank-
rupted it. They abandoned the grand liberal traditions 
of learning" (334). They, in other words, destroyed 
the object of Bloom's love, and he obviously cannot 
ever forgive them for it. 
Had Bloom confined himself to a discussion of the 
episode that he treats at the beginning of this chapter, 
he might have earned a certain measure of sympathy 
both for his views and for his sentiments. He tells us 
about a series of incidents that took place at Cornell 
University during April of 1969. These events culmi-
nated in the spectacle of "ten thousand triumphant 
students supporting a group of black students who 
had just persuaded 'us,' the faculty of Cornell Univer-
sity, to do their will by threatening the use of firearms 
as well as threatening the lives of individual profes-
sors" (313). 
This spectacle and other related events, such as the 
threat made by a black faculty member upon the life 
of a black student when the student refused to partici-
pate in a demonstration, do warrant a certain measure 
of outrage and moral indignation. And for a time, 
Bloom directs his own indignation at what are, given 
his thesis, its proper objects, at the university, its facul-
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ty, and its administration, for having displayed in this 
instance "a mixture of cowardice and moralism not 
uncommon at the time" (316). 
Whatever degree of sympathy one might have for 
Bloom or for his views should quickly dissipate, how-
ever, as he turns from his account of what happened 
at a particular place at a particular time to the most 
careless and irresponsible treatment of "the Sixties" 
and the "student movement" that I have ever read. 
And Bloom gives us, ironically enough, the explana-
tion for why his account is so poorly reasoned and so 
thoughtlessly composed. "Indignation," he asserts in 
the middle of "The Sixties" chapter, "may be a most 
noble passion and necessary for fighting wars and 
righting wrongs. But of all the experiences of the soul 
it is the most inimical to reason and hence to the uni-
versity" (327). In other words, indignation may have 
been necessary for Bloom's efforts to right the wrongs 
he witnessed at Cornell in April of 1969, but it is inim-
ical to his efforts now to give a reasonable account of 
the 1960s. 
The defects of Bloom's account of the Sixties are 
worth examining in some detail, for they both display 
and explain some of the defects that pervade his book. 
He assures us that "about the Sixties it is now fashion-
able to say that although there were indeed excesses, 
many good things resulted" (320). This claim is false. 
The Sixties have come to occupy a place in the minds 
of a cohort of educated Americans that is similar in 
some respects to the place once occupied by the 
Dreyfus affair in France. Those who endured the Six-
ties have come to feel that it marked something of a 
cultural and a political divide in American history, and 
they have enlisted themselves on one side or the other 
of a whole range of questions about the character of 
the American democratic experiment by taking up 
fixed positions on the meaning and the value of that 
ill-defined period. 
There simply is no currently fashionable consensus 
about the matter of the Sixties. If anything, contempo-
rary thought about the Sixties has tended toward more 
negative appraisals. Thus, as so often happens in his 
book, Bloom is actually on the side of majority opinion 
even as he fancies himself to be a voice crying in the 
wilderness. Indeed, Bloom may have by now discov-
ered this much for himself, and the great popularity 
of his book should seem less inexplicable to him now 
than it did at first. 
One of the best historical treatments of the Sixties, 
Allen Matusow's The Unraveling of America, might also 
seem to be in basic accord with Bloom's attitudes, for 
Matusow, like Bloom, severely criticizes both the stu-
dent movement and assorted radical groups such as 
the Black Panthers. But here the similarity between 
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Matusow and Bloom ends, because Matusow interprets 
the Sixties in terms of the failure of American 
liberalism, a failure that he understands in terms of 
social, political, moral, and intellectual defects within 
liberalism. And for Matusow, the Vietnam war, more 
than anything else, both exposed and accelerated the 
demise of liberal democracy. Indeed, if Matusow is 
correct, a portion of Bloom's thesis should be inverted: 
during the 1960s, liberal democracy failed the univer-
sities, not vice-versa. 
If one refuses to consider the war in 
Vietnam as part of an effort to 
understand student speech and 
behavior during the 1960s, one is 
bound to develop bizarre and untenable 
explanations. And so Bloom does. 
Bloom should have at least considered some version 
of Matusow's thesis about the failure of liberalism. I 
doubt that Bloom has read Matusow, since Bloom's 
book gives no evidence of his having done so. But 
Bloom has read and he often invokes Tocqueville, who 
said some very instructive things about democracies at 
war. Democratic regimes, Tocqueville observed, are 
the slowest to engage in warfare, but, once engaged, 
they are the least apt to cease fighting short of total 
victory or defeat. 
Thus, Bloom should have pondered the effects of a 
war-whose purposes were obscure and ever shifting, 
whose leadership was inept, whose pretexts were de-
ceptive, and whose terms of victory and defeat were so 
uncertain as to render the conflict potentially inter-
minable-upon liberal democracy and more especially 
upon the generation of young people who were con-
scripted into its service. Yet no trace of such consider-
ation appears in Bloom's chapter on the Sixties. In-
deed, Bloom has done something I would have 
thought impossible for a responsible thinker: he has 
analyzed the Sixties without even once mentioning the war in 
Vietnam. (This is not, strictly speaking, true, for on p. 
329 Bloom does mention "the war" in a subordinate 
clause at the end of a paragraph .) 
The beginnings of the student movement antedated 
the war, of course, being linked initially to aspects of 
the Civil Rights movement of the Fifties and early Six-
ties. But the student movement would never have be-
come a large-scale movement had it not been for the 
war, which proved properly to be the central concern 
of the students as the Sixties progressed. Thus, if one 
refuses to consider the war as part of an effort to un-
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derstand student speech and behavior during the 
1960s, one is bound to develop bizarre and untenable 
explanations. And so Bloom does. 
At times, in his desperate effort to explain student 
and faculty behavior without the war, Bloom resorts to 
rhetorical strategies that he finds contemptible in his 
subjects. So, for example, he has this to say about the 
loose moral reasoning of the Sixties: "Hitler became 
the regulative principle of the conscience: 'You 
wouldn't obey Hitler, would you?' So refined had the 
capacity for moral discrimination become, it followed 
that the elected American officials and the duly ap-
proved federal, state, and local laws had no more au-
thority than did Hitler" (326). As though he does not 
wish to be outdone by his subjects' specious argu-
ments , Bloom himself compares Woodstock to the 
Nuremberg rallies of the Third Reich (314), and he 
insists that there was no appreciable difference be-
tween American professors collaborating with the stu-
dent movement of the 1960s and Martin Heidegger's 
capitulating to the Nazis (315). 
Other defects in Bloom's analysis of the Sixties are 
less obvious and therefore more insidious. For exam-
ple, he insists that "a histrionic version of moral con-
duct, the kind that characterizes heroes in extreme 
situations," dominated the Sixties. "Thomas More's re-
sistance to a tyrant's command was the daily fare of 
students' imagination. Such challenges-which arise 
rarely, are always ambiguous in terms of both duty 
and motive, and require the subtlest reasoning as well 
as all the other virtues in the highest degree in order 
to be addressed justly-were the moral stuff on which 
these cubs teethed. It was not, of course, the complex-
ity of such cases that was attractive but their brilliance, 
the noble pose." (325). These are half-truths. 
Some of us did look to More for instruction and in-
spiration, as we looked to the Socrates of the Crito, 
who argued that it was a good thing to obey even a 
bad law, or to St. Augustine and his teachings about 
just and unjust wars. But it was precisely the complex-
ity of these examples and arguments that drew some 
of us to them. We knew that More had sought out 
every possible means honorably to serve his king. We 
believed that his example was a warning against grand 
and precipitous moral confrontations. 
And so most of us practically memorized the Selec-
tive Service laws, believing that we should exhaust all 
legal remedies before we considered choosing to dis-
obey those laws. Many of us believed that we also 
owed something of our own knowledge about these 
matters to those of our fellow citizens who were ignor-
ant of the legal options open to them, and so we 
served as draft counsellors to the poor and unedu-
cated. Some of us ultimately won conscientious-objec-
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tor status, others refused induction and went to 
prison, others emigrated. None of those who were my 
friends at the time sought, much less relished, grand 
moral posturing. We were rather inclined to agree 
with Dietrich Bonhoeffer who taught us that in many 
circumstances "there is no pure place to stand." 
My testimony here proves very little, of course. My 
friends at Valparaiso University and later at Stanford 
may have been atypical. But I doubt that our opinions 
and actions were any less typical than those that 
Bloom ascribes to a nebulous "they" (does he mean all 
students, most students, students at elite colleges and 
universities, students at Cornell, or, as in the passage 
above, "these cubs"?). I really do not yet fully under-
stand the student movement, though I suspect that we 
will always have a skewed view of it if we dwell 
primarily upon students at Columbia, Berkeley, Michi-
gan, and Cornell. 
In any event, Bloom manages less to interpret a 
movement and more to disclose the depth of the 
trauma that he suffered in the midst of one particu-
larly outrageous episode of that movement. He really 
does mean to ascribe the thoughts and actions he con-
demns to the entire student movement. And this as-
cription seems unjustified. My testimony does suggest 
that much. 
Traumatized and indignant, Bloom 
really gives us, in his chapter on 
the Sixties, a combination of a 
lament disguised as philosophy and 
a harangue disguised as history. 
Traumatized and indignant, Bloom really gives us, 
in his Sixties chapter, a combination of a lament dis-
guised as philosophy and a harangue disguised as his-
tory. One is reminded here of Thomas Paine's rejoin-
der in The Rights of Man to the "historical" portions of 
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France. "Mr. 
Burke should recollect that he is writing history and 
not plays; and that his readers will expect truth, and 
not the spouting rant of high-toned declamation . . . . 
I cannot consider Mr. Burke's book in scarcely any 
other light than a dramatic performance; and he must, 
I think, have considered it in the same light himself, 
by the poetical liberties he has taken of omitting some 
facts, distorting others, and making the machinery 
bend to produce a stage effect." 
Bloom produces his own stage effects, including a 
ludicrous scene, one of his "greatest satisfactions as a 
teacher," when some of his students, "who really looked 
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down from the classroom on the frantic activity out-
side," went "down from the library seminar room into 
the agora," and there distributed what they deemed 
appropriate lines from Plato's Republic to the rabble 
(332; italics Bloom's). But Bloom's Sixties chapter is 
Burke without the latter's rhetorical elegance, without 
even an ancien regime to mourn. 
IV 
The ancien regime of university education in the 
United States had already begun seriously to crumble 
by the time Bloom arrived, just after World War II, 
at the University of Chicago and fell in love with it. 
This is the thesis of Parts II and III of The Closing of 
the American Mind. Part II, entitled "Nihilism, Ameri-
can Style," examines the process by which "Western 
rationalism has culminated in a rejection of reason" 
(240). Part III, entitled "The University," provides 
what Bloom calls an "idiosyncratic history of the uni-
versity" that is designed to trace its decline from an 
Enlightenment version that was, for all its faults, gov-
erned by reason, to a mid-twentieth-century version 
that is governed, if at all, by a concern for "values" 
and "value commitments" (312). In a final chapter, 
"The Student and the University," Bloom surveys the 
bleak condition of today's university, and he suggests 
a few measures for improving its plight. 
These are the strongest sections of Bloom's book. 
Part II is really about relativism, its origins, and its 
triumph, albeit in various anemic forms, within both 
popular and academic culture in the United States. In 
Bloom's judgment, this intellectual development repre-
sents the victory of German ideas, especially the 
thought of Nietzsche and Weber, over the American 
mind. He is most troubled by the unthinking way in 
which most Americans have adopted relativistic per-
spectives and vocabularies. "It is not the immorality of 
relativism that I find appalling. What is astounding 
and degrading is the dogmatism with which we accept 
such relativism, and our easygoing lack of concern 
about what that means for our lives" (239). 
In Part III, Bloom addresses in a sustained and rel-
atively measured fashion a number of thorny issues, 
such as the shifting historical relationships between 
philosophy and politics, the related matter of the 
sometimes healthy tension between the university and 
society, and the struggle between Ancients and Mod-
erns "for the possession of rationalism" (264). He also 
advances his own ideas about the vocation of the uni-
versity. He argues that the university must first of all 
"maintain the permanent questions front and center ... 
by keeping alive the works of those who best address-
ed these questions" (252). Knowing the questions, the 
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university will "protect reason from itself' by preserv-
ing a variety of alternative explorations of them (253). 
But Bloom is not arguing here for a mere inventory 
of opinions and arguments; rather, he insists that the 
parts of a university must understand themselves in 
terms of an overall "quest for and even discovery of 
the truth according to nature" (254). 
Bloom is by no means the first thinker to identify 
relativism as the central problem of our times, but his 
treatment of relativism and its attendant difficulties is 
often fresh and sometimes searching. I doubt that rel-
ativism is quite so monolithic an academic position as 
Bloom supposes, and I believe that its roots are deeper 
and more tangled than Bloom's analysis would 
suggest. I therefore prefer Alasdair Macintyre to 
Bloom as a cultural diagnostician. 
Bloom is by no means the first 
thinker to identify relativism as 
the central problem of our times, 
but his treatment of relativism and 
its attendant difficulties is often 
fresh and sometimes searching. 
In his After Virtue, Macintyre demonstrates that our 
moral discourse consists of opinions and arguments 
drawn from a number of incompatible traditions of 
moral thought. Thus, for Macintyre, our problem is 
intellectual incoherence, not merely relativism. On the 
other hand, Macintyre develops an account of the 
good life, based upon his reading of Aristotle, that 
tends to be an exquisitely elaborate version of the rel-
ativism that Bloom condemns. Bloom, informed espe-
cially by Plato but also by his rather different reading 
of Aristotle, insists that there is really a correct account 
of both nature and the good life that we can in prin-
ciple know, and that the soundness of this account will 
not depend, as it does for Macintyre, in any essential 
way upon our own individual life stories, practices, or 
community ties. 
Whatever the case, both men would agree that the 
current problems of the university are finally 
philosophical in nature. We therefore need more and 
better thought about the university, not an endless 
parade of quick and superficial "remedies" that re-
spond to popular trends and demands. 
Such thinking might profitably begin with a more 
thorough study of Macintyre and, yes, of the second 
and third parts of Bloom's book, minus the offensive. 
chapter about the Sixties. These parts of Bloom's book 
are relatively free of the snide and frivolous remarks 
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that permeate the rest of it. Readers will simply have 
to ignore Bloom's suggestion that John Rawls' Theory 
of justice makes it possible to understand Fear of Flying 
as "a significant expression of our situation" (229). 
And they will have to try to forgive his caricature of 
Hannah Arendt as an American Lotte Lenya, singing 
siren songs of "neurotic and decadent longing" like 
those that once charmed the Weimar Republic to be-
witch the souls of our people (151-2). 
These acts of restraint and charity on the part of the 
reader will open the possibility of learning from 
Bloom's often penetrating discussions of thinkers such 
as Rousseau, Locke, and Nietzsche. For in these discus-
sions Bloom' does manage to exemplify his ideal of the 
liberally educated human being: someone who thinks 
about and with the great thinkers about perennially 
vital matters of human concern. In the remainder of 
the book, one will find precious little of "that refine-
ment of the mind's eye that permits it to see the deli-
cate distinctions among men, among their deeds and 
their motives" that should, according to Bloom, 
characterize one who has been nourished by the Great 
Books. 
The hypothesis suggested by the title of the present 
essay represents my own effort to account for this 
wildly uneven quality of Bloom's book, which, I do be-
lieve, really is the somewhat mad lament of a disap-
pointed lover. Bloom is correct: "The philosophic life 
is not the university" (272). But he has forgotten this, 
or rather he has often confused his love of wisdom 
and truth for his love of a particular place at a par-
ticular time. He should and does know, in his better 
moments, that wisdom and truth are eternal, whereas 
even the University of Chicago will pass away. 
There are, moreover, other loves, apparently un-
dreamed of in Bloom's philosophy, that can and have 
served well as spurs to inquiry. Our students do long 
for "the overcoming of necessity, tension, and conflict, 
a resting of the soul from its eternal travail." And this 
desire is not, as Bloom would have it, "the most pow-
erful of modern longings" (51; italics mine). "Oh Lord, 
Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are 
restless until they rest in Thee." This was written by 
St. Augustine at the beginning of one of the few great 
books about education, and the Augustine of the Con-
fessions was surely not a Modern in any sense of the 
word. 
Perhaps we can at last respond in part to at least 
one of Bloom's questions. "Are we lovers anymore?" 
he asks. "This is my way of putting the educational 
question of our times" (133). Bloom at least is a lover, 
and doubtless there are others. But those of us who 
seek enlightenment about liberal education had best 
beware of the disappointed ones. ~~ 
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ROWING TO SWEDEN 
A Postmodern Confession of Faith 
The subject is God. It arises, today, this way: 
It is early morning, and I am lying in bed, drifting 
toward wakefulness. My wife curls against me. Softly, 
mostly still asleep, she says, "I love you." I put my arm 
around her, and she repositions herself with her head 
on my chest. I brush my hand across her warm flank 
and nestle my face into her hair. And I find myself 
praymg. 
I pray, "Thank you, God, for this woman, for the 
love we share, for the opportunity to know love and 
to understand its distinction from desire. Thank you 
that after ten years with this woman my love continues 
to grow and to seem daily as wondrous to me as all 
existence must to a new-born babe. Thank you for the 
life we have built together. Thank you for the security 
our love affords us ." 
This prayer is heartfelt and sincere. But then I am 
conscious of praying it, and I am shocked. For I do 
not believe in God. 
Or if I believe in God, I do so only intermittently. 
And even when I believe in God, I do so only hesi-
tantly. Always, I think, as applied to me, the words 
"wish for God" are more apt than the words "believe 
in God." And yet my wish for God is a constant force 
in my life. I wish for God frequently, find myself 
thanking God for my blessings regularly. And always 
I ask myself, "How can this be?" 
What follows is a chimera, one part essay, one part 
autobiographical rumination, one part literary criti-
cism, a layman's labored answer to the question, "How 
can this be?" 
Fredrick Barton is Chairman of Freshman English at the 
University of New Orleans where he teaches Creative Writing 
and Film Criticism. He is Film Editor and columnist for the 
newsmagazine Gambit and the author of two novels, The 
El Cholo Feeling Passes and Courting Pandemonium. 
His most recent contribution to The Cresset, "The Tenure 
Trap," appeared in March, 1981 . 
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The subject is God, His (or Her - I will use the 
masculine pronoun out of convention - actually, I 
think of God as without gender) existence, most im-
portant His presence and activity in the contemporary 
world. It arises, today, this way: 
I find myself giving thanks to God for my wife and 
for the astonishing blessing that is my love for her. 
And then I am conscious of my prayer and I am an-
noyed with myself. For, though my belief in Him is 
murky at best, I am annoyed with God. 
I am annoyed with God because I have recently 
been going through a bad time. The particular cir-
cumstances of this period of unhappiness are not re-
ally relevant - I have suffered other such periods in 
the past and will no doubt suffer more in the future. 
But I will pause to say that my current situation in-
volves the impending loss of some employment I have 
enjoyed outside of my duties at the university, employ-
ment that provides me with a nice bit of extra income 
every year through work that I very much look for-
ward to performing. I am losing this employment, in 
my view, because the executive abilities of my em-
ployer are severely impaired. In ending our relation-
ship, in other words, he is, I judge, making a griev-
ously stupid mistake. But much as I am angrily frus-
trated with my employer, secretly, subconsciously, I 
blame God. 
I blame God in whom I only dimly and only occa-
sionally believe. And thus I remind myself of Lieuten-
ant Scheisskopfs wife from Joseph Heller's black com-
edy about World War II, Catch-22. Lieutenant 
Scheisskopfs wife is an avowed atheist who gets into 
a violent argument with the protagonist, Yossarian, 
with whom she agrees that there is no God. 
The God in whom Yossarian disbelieves is responsi-
ble for "such phenomena as phlegm and tooth decay." 
"What in the world was running through that warped, 
evil, scatalogical mind of His, "Yossarian asks Lieuten-
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ant Scheisskopfs wife, "when He robbed old people of 
the power to control their bowel movements?" And 
"Why in the world did he ever create pain?'' 
Lieutenant Scheisskopfs wife responds to Yossa-
rian's tirade with the illogical admission that "the God 
I don't believe in is a good God, a just God, a merciful 
God. He's not the mean and stupid God you make 
him out to be." And that's how I'm like Lieutenant 
Scheisskopfs wife. The God I don't believe in is the 
God of Jesus of Nazareth. He is a good God, a just 
God, and a merciful God. And I am angry at him for 
not recognizing that I am a fundamentally decent 
human being who does not deserve to be deprived of 
this instance of employment I so cherish. 
As I lie awake in the early morning, having caught 
myself giving thanks for my wife, I suddenly know 
that I blame God for my recent period of pain because 
I have not once called upon Him for either solace or 
relief. I think, I guess, that if God is doing his job, He 
should know of my anguish, that I should hardly have 
to remind Him that I don't want to be unfairly de-
prived of my job. Haven't I thanked God for the bless-
ing of this employment often enough in the past for 
Him to be convinced that I love it? 
I chide myself, of course, that my loss of this work 
can hardly rank as one of God's top priorities. No 
matter how much I enjoy it, it's a second job after all, 
a mere supplement to my income. I will survive quite 
nicely without it. It's not as if I'm going to be im-
poverished. It's not as if I'm physically maimed. There 
are, in other words, an infinite number of worse 
things that could happen to me. And an infinite 
number of worse things are obviously happening to 
other people every day, things God would surely give 
his attention before the loss of a college professor's 
supplemental employment. 
But then I examine my self-chastisement. It is based 
on the frustrating acknowledgement that my suffering 
is insignificant beside the suffering of others and thus 
the implication that I have little standing to call on 
God for relief. But isn't such a premise based upon a 
nettling assumption about God's presence and activity 
in the world? Does God have priorities? If God has 
priorities, doesn't that imply some limitation on His 
ability to act in the world? Doesn't that imply some 
limits to his power? And doesn 't that call into question 
God's very godliness? 
And so I reflect on what it is I think about God, on 
how I think about his godliness. I was raised in a re-
ligious family. My father was a Baptist minister, a New 
Testament professor at a Baptist seminary for many 
years. I was reared to believe in the God of Jesus 
Christ. "God is Love," I was told. "God is like Jesus." 
And so I believed in a God who was longsuffering, 
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compassionate, and forgiving. 
But I was also taught to believe in a God of power 
and activity in this world , a God who listened to our 
prayers and responded to them if our motives were 
pure and our requests unselfish. I was taught that 
God's designs for this world were complex, of course, 
that they were not always in keeping with those of His 
followers. I was taught that the ways of God were mys-
terious but that in the end all things were part of 
God's design, that all things worked together for good. 
And so I reflect on what it is I think 
about God, on how I think about his 
godliness. I was raised in a 
religious family. My father was a 
Baptist minister, a New Testament 
professor at a Baptist seminary. 
Certainly I was taught that God was omnipotent -
all powerful - that there was no aspect of this world 
which He could not directly alter if it became part of 
His design to do so; and that God was omniscient -
all knowing - that no aspect of existence in this world 
escaped His knowledge. And as a child these teachings 
were part of the security of my upbringing, to live in 
a world which was presided over by a God who cared 
for me, who knew my needs and who had the power 
to protect me from evil. 
But then I grew up. The kinds of self-doubt that 
plague all teen-agers were aggravated in my case, 
somewhat, by my family's two relocations between 
1963 and 1965 and the result that I attended three 
different high schools and seemed forever to be start-
ing over at the task of making friends and developing 
a social circle. Oddly, this was the period of my great-
est religious devotion. My commitment to prayer has 
never been greater. I beseeched God to deliver me 
from my adolescent suffering. And by the time I 
graduated from high school I was convinced that He 
had. 
My years in college, however, would see that devo-
tion wither and then die. My social life was no longer 
the problem. But all other aspects of my life were in 
turmoil, and God now seemed deaf to all my prayers. 
The moves my parents made when I was in high 
school were the result of my father's declining profes-
sional fortunes. He was both a political and theological 
liberal in a denomination noted for its staunch con-
servatism. By 1965 his career in teaching was over. By 
1967 he was through as a Baptist. By 1968 my parents 
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would divorce, their marriage destroyed in a domestic 
tornado spawned by the hurricane demolishing 
Father's professional life. 
I took all these developments hard. For a time I 
sought refuge in the old tenets that God's ways are 
mysterious but that His grand design is at work in the 
world, that all things work together for good. In that 
light I sought, with increasing difficulty, to believe that 
my father would somehow emerge from his trials 
purer and better able to serve, stronger for his testing 
in the purging fires of unwarranted suffering. 
But as 1968 meandered on and my heroes Martin 
Luther King and Robert Kennedy fell to senseless vio-
lence and Eugene McCarthy's message of peace and 
redemption got lost in a nation flirting at once with 
fascism on one hand and anarchy on the other, my 
prayers took on a desperate, demanding quality. What 
was God waiting for? When was he going to banish the 
injustice that seemed to be crushing me and every-
thing I believed in? 1968 was a fearful, fretful year in 
my spiritual life. At some point my belief in God dis-
appeared. But for a time I was too timid to admit it. 
Then, in 1969, I made the bitter leap to avowed 
atheism. The cause I remember with the clarity of a 
deed in progress. The method was human logic. I 
read an article in the newspaper about an event of in-
conceivable horror. Hurricane Camille had raged 
through my native Gulf South. Somewhere along the 
Mississippi coast, a young couple and their infant 
daughter had been caught by the storm with only their 
aluminum house trailer for shelter. Camille had 
snatched that flimsy refuge in her 200-mile-per-hour 
clutches and had flung it over a mile inland, upside 
down into a ravine. The adults were killed instantly, 
but, protected by her bassinet, the baby miraculously 
survived. She lived, coroners somehow later deter-
mined, another forty-eight hours or so. And, they 
judged, still living, she was feasted upon by maddened 
river rats, crazed by Camille's flooding of salt water 
into their freshwater habitat. What kind of God, I 
asked myself, could allow such a thing? 
And I was thus crushed by the illogic of such a no-
tion as the God I had always been taught to believe in. 
If God was indeed omniscient, then He certainly knew 
of this little girl's circumstances. If He was omnipo-
tent, then He possessed the power to have delivered 
her from such an unspeakable fate. And if He was 
merciful, was a caring, compassionate God, then He 
would certainly have done so. What manner of being 
with the power to have done so would have not? 
There was no grand design imaginable, no process for 
good possibly at work that required this obviously in-
nocent child's unfathomable suffering. And so what to 
make of a God who had allowed it? 
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I was forced, it seemed, to choose between one of 
several unappealing alternatives. Either 1) God was 
not omniscient and so didn't know about the incident, 
or 2) He was not omnipotent and so, even if He knew, 
was somehow limited in His ability to relieve her suf-
fering, or 3) He both knew and had the power to save 
her but chose not to and was, therefore, indisputably, 
not good, compassionate, and merciful. 
I recognized instantly that if either 1) or 2) were 
true, then God was severely lacking in His crucial 
quality of godliness. What kind of god is a weak and 
impotent god? On the other hand, if 3) were true, if 
God were callous or perhaps even cruel, then why in 
the world was He worth believing in? And so I chose 
a fourth option: God did not exist. 
I drifted for some years in the spiritual void of this 
grudging atheism, unable to solve Camille's riddle. I 
took to blunting attempts to draw me into serious re-
ligious discussions with the quip that, like Ghandi, "I 
might be Christian, except for Christians." But my 
background made me uncomfortable with what it was 
I no longer believed. 
And I struggled, now, to answer new sets of ques-
tions that arose immediately upon God's demise. All 
my life I had known to behave in a certain fashion: 
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the way God would have me behave. I should keep the 
Commandments. I should love my neighbor as myself. 
I should do these things because God had created me, 
had decreed these ways of behaving as good, would 
reward me if I did, would punish me if I did not. But 
what imperatives endured in the absence of God? Why 
was hedonism not a perfectly appropriate response to 
a world without God? 
After a time I found answers to those questions , and 
considerable solace, in a strain of Existentialism that 
expresses itself in Albert Camus' The Plague. In that 
book Camus erects a model of human life at its most 
trying. Bubonic plague has broken out in the North 
African city of Oran. The city is quarantined . The 
citizenry is trapped. Deaths number in the hundreds 
every day. The suffering of those afflicted is horrible. 
And medical science is powerless to heal or save or 
even alleviate pain. 
The book's narrator and protagonist, Bernard 
Rieux, is an Oran physician. He is also an atheist. He 
regards the notion that the plague is an element of 
God's will as spineless nonsense. But he is gradually 
exhausted by his labors in fighting the plague. No-
thing that he does makes a difference. He can't list a 
single patient that he's been able to help. 
Still, he keeps up his hopeless struggle against the 
disease. He is incensed at those, black marketeers and 
other agents of corruption, who make a profit from 
the circumstances of the plague. He refuses to ap-
prove the determination of one acquaintance who 
wants to escape. He rejects the surrender of another 
who commits suicide. Choosing as his hero, Grand, a 
physically weak and intellectually limited clerk who 
possesses only "a little goodness of heart and the seem-
ingly absurd ideal" to do everything in his power to 
fight the plague, Rieux evolves a personal existential 
ethic that requires humane action in a godless world. 
It works this way: In a world without God, survival 
is as logical as suicide, and survival's product, life, 
however bleakly absurd, is superior because it is some-
thing while death is nothing. The only sensible impera-
tive is to affirm life, to live in such a way as to support 
those forces which promote life's dignity. Life may in-
deed be short, repetitive, painful, and purposeless, but 
it is all we have. 
Camus' metaphor for this approach to living he 
based on the Greek myth of Sisyphus, the mortal who 
rails at a divine order that requires his death . In the 
myth, the gods punish Sisyphus by granting his wish 
for eternal life and then condemn him to the singular, 
repetitive, monotonous, exhausting, pointless job of 
rolling a boulder up a hill, a hill too high to be over-
come in a single day, a boulder which the gods vic-
iously push back to the bottom at the end of every day 
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when a spent Sisyphus pauses te rest. Camus posits 
Sisyphus as a model for all human existence and then, 
radically, challenges us to see Sisyphus as happy. 
There is an attractive defiance in such an approach 
to life. And it sustained me through the rough times 
of the late Sixties and early Seventies. It is capable, I 
think, of sustaining me still. In an injust world that 
ends in certain defeat, there is something powerfully 
compelling about an attitude that nonetheless refuses 
to concede, that defies fate to the very end as does the 
philosopher Bokonon in Kurt Vonnegut's Gat's Cradle, 
whose response to a ruined world reads: "I would 
make a statue of myself, lying on my back, grinning 
horribly, and thumbing my nose at You Know Who. " 
Existentialism sustained me through 
the rough times of the late Sixties 
and early Seventies. In an unjust 
world that ends in certain defeat, 
there is something powerfully 
compelling about an attitude that 
nonetheless refuses to concede. 
But there is an unavoidable bleakness to this ap-
proach. And though I was sustained by Camus and 
the Sisyphean model , I was also aware how its existen-
tial imperative, in the hands of writers, like Vonnegut, 
for instance, can become less a bugle call to righteous 
battle and more the resigned dirge of "So it goes." De-
fiance was adequate as a last resort, in other words, 
but I frequently hungered for something more, some-
thing for the times when the anger that defiance re-
quires is inappropriate. 
And then into my world came a sixth or an eighth 
or a tenth reading of Joseph Heller's magnificent 
Catch-22. In the midst of that reading, suddenly I 
grasped something that I had never seen before. 
Through the infectious laughter of Heller's dizzying 
humor, quite abruptly, I understood the difference be-
tween belief and faith. 
As a critic of a kind, who teaches Catch-22 to college 
lit students, I had long been idly puzzled by the 
novel's opening lines : "It was love at first sight. The 
first time Yossarian saw the chaplain he fell madly in 
love with him." I had always seen the chaplain as a 
thoroughly secondary character in the book, a symbol 
of religion's impotence to be meaningful in the mod-
ern world. 
Chaplain A. T. Tappman is a likable, earnest, de-
cent human being with a genuine concern for his fel-
lows and an almost total incapacity to help them. But 
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at the end of the novel, I realized this time, he does 
something pivotal; he provides something that makes 
all the difference. And thus I realized why it was that 
Yossarian loved him and why he loved him "at first 
sight." 
As Catch-22 wends toward its conclusion, Yossarian 
is caught on the horns of a wicked dilemma. Most of 
his friends are dead, killed flying the exorbitant 
number of combat missions required by Yossarian's 
unscrupulously ambitious commander, Colonel 
Cathcart. Suffering from a version of battle fatigue, 
Yossarian has unsuccessfully sought for months to be 
rotated off combat status. With seventy missions under 
his belt, twenty more than required by any other com-
mander, Yossarian finally refuses to continue flying. 
And coupled with Cathcart's reluctance to prosecute 
him - Cathcart is afraid of the negative implications 
for his own career such a prosecution might mean -
Yossarian's one-man mutiny threatens to spawn a rev-
olution. 
So Cathcart and his executive aide, Lt. Col. Korn, 
fashion a deal that becomes Yossarian's great tempta-
tion: they offer to promote him, award him a new 
medal, and send him home a hero. All he has to do 
is collaborate with their plans to jump the required 
number of missions from seventy to eighty - or even 
higher. In Col. Korn's terms all Yossarian has to do is 
"Like us." At first, selfishly, Yossarian agrees. But then 
in an unrelated incident he's wounded, and while re-
cuperating he reconsiders. 
The novel reaches its climax with Y ossarian in the 
hospital, facing his several unappealing options, each 
of which has been previously embraced by one of his 
friends or acquaintances. Major Danby informs Yossa-
rian that the deal is still on and that to make sure he 
takes it, Cathcart and Korn have falsified a series of 
documents indicting Yossarian for every offense from 
blackmarketeering to espionage. Should he try to back 
out, they plan to court-martial him without endanger-
ing themselves through a discussion of the number of 
missions they've required. 
At first Y ossarian considers the response taken by 
his friend Dunbar, who tried to enhance the seeming 
length of his life through activities that bored him. "I 
might stay right here in this hospital bed and vege-
tate," Yossarian tells Danby. But the strategy hasn't 
worked for Dunbar who first lost his laugh and ulti-
mately disappeared. Dunbar's lesson is that to cease 
acting in the world is to cease being human. And mere 
life without one's humanity is hardly worth having. 
But the alternative of collaboration, like that em-
braced by former pals Wintergreen and Milo, Y ossa-
rian can no longer abide. "It's a way to save yourself," 
Danby counsels. But Yossarian knows better. He thinks 
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of ihe friends such an action would betray. He thinks 
of the way his compliance would be used to force 
cooperation from others lacking his aggressiveness. He 
doesn't employ such language, but he thinks about col-
laboration's implications for his soul. "It's a way to lose 
myself, Danby," he concludes. "You ought to know 
that." 
Yossarian could, of course, agree to return to his 
unit and fly more missions. But that is tantamount to 
suicide. All of his friends who continued to fly are 
now dead. Rejecting that, too, Yossarian arrives at the 
end of his rope. Earlier in the novel he has con-
templated a violent course, joining Dobbs in a plan to 
murder Cathcart and Korn. But he has seen the way 
in which violence gets instantly out of control as Dobbs 
keeps adding potential victims to his death list and fi-
nally includes people Yossarian considers friends. 
Thus his options now are jail for defiance, survival 
through collaboration or inhuman vegetation, or 
suicide. And none of them are acceptable. In despair, 
Yossarian confides to Danby, "Then there is no hope 
for us, is there?" 
"No, no hope at all," Danby concedes. 
But then into this attitude of despair, the novel's un-
questioned low-point, bursts the chaplain "with the 
electrifying news about Orr," Yossarian's former 
roomie who was presumed drowned after his plane 
crash-landed in the Adriatic. "Sweden," cries the chap-
lain. "It's a miracle, I tell you! A miracle! I believe in 
God again. I really do. Washed ashore in Sweden after 
so many weeks at sea! It's a miracle." 
But Yossarian, who knew Orr best, sees the event in 
slightly different terms. "Washed ashore, hell!" he de-
clares. "He didn't wash ashore in Sweden. He rowed 
there! He rowed there, chaplain, he rowed there." 
"Well, I don't care!" the chaplain flings back with 
undiminished zeal, "It's still a miracle." 
And indeed it is. It's a miracle that refills Yossarian's 
empty fuel tanks of hope. And he's launched back into 
action. The example, of course, is absurd - that Orr 
has rowed a rubber life raft from the Mediterranean 
to the North Sea. And the action it inspires is equally 
absurd. Yossarian decides upon a fifth, previously un-
considered, option, to join Orr in flight to Sweden. 
For years I saw this ending to Catch-22 in purely 
existential terms. There can be no question that Orr, 
the alternative, is the book's Sisyphean figure. Like 
Grand in The Pla[!;Ue he is a man of only modest 
abilities, but a man with an unlimited capacity for per-
severance. Like Sisyphus he is undaunted by the un-
ending need to start over. 
But then on this sixth or eighth or tenth reading of 
Catch-22, I saw that something new. I saw that the 
good news about Orr was brought by the chaplain, the 
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man of religion, the man of the gospel. Yossarian may 
not see Orr's purported salvation in the chaplain's 
terms exactly. But he doesn't deny the chaplain's des-
ignation of Orr's survival as a miracle. And on the 
basis of that miracle, Yossarian is himself revived. 
So what does all this mean for me and my life? And 
why do I think about it as I lie in a warm embrace 
with my wife and contemplate my annoyance with a 
God in whom I have trouble believing? I recall it 
today, as I always do in such circumstances now, be-
cause it was understanding the implications of Catch-
22's end that brought me in from atheism's cold. 
Following Camus' imperative to affirm life requires 
a venture into the void. One chooses to act as Dr. 
Rieux or Grand acts because one believes that life is 
something whereas death is nothing. But there's no 
unassailable logic to such a system. A nihilist could flail 
its inconsistencies as surely as I, with Camille's riddle, 
have religion's. 
Who is finally to say that life is something? There 
are certainly those willing to argue that life is worse 
than nothing. The Existentialist conquers despair by 
making up his own life-affirming rules and then striv-
ing to live by them. It requires only a tiny adjustment 
to include in that process of rule-creating a belief in, 
or better faith in, a God who cares for us and has the 
knowledge and power to look out for us. 
Does Yossarian know that Orr has safely rowed to 
Sweden? How can he? What evidence does he have for 
such an absurd notion? He has the chaplain's word. 
Does Yossarian believe the chaplain? Who knows? But 
he has faith in the chaplain's good news about a mira-
cle. How do we know? He acts on it. And so does this 
mean that Yossarian, too, finds safe harbor in Swe-
den? We don't know. 
But we know that Yossarian has been saved all the 
same because he has been reborn to action. And it 
doesn't matter that his action is both absurd and based 
on faith in the word of a chaplain about an event 
which is itself absurd. For Yossarian is in every way 
better off than he was when confronted with his series 
of bleak alternatives. Adumbrating all the dangers 
Yossarian faces if he tries to join Orr, Danby con-
cludes that "It won't be fun." 
But Yossarian disagrees. "Yes it will," he maintains. 
Yossarian is saved by faith in a miracle. And today, 
in my most recent hour of need, so am I. I am sur-
rounded by miracles. Joseph Heller's Catch-22 is a 
miracle. Life is a miracle. Most powerfully, love is a 
miracle. My Sunday School teachers were right when 
they told me that God is love. I would put it now: to 
know love, is to know God. 
And so buoyed by the miracle of love, I am saved 
for still another day. My belief in God remains cloudy 
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and troubled. But based on these miracles my faith in 
God is growing stronger. I have long since chosen de-
fiant survival over hedonistic collaboration or suicide. 
I have simply added another absurd element to that 
leap into the void. Given that nothing about human 
life makes logical sense, having faith in a benevolent 
God makes no less sense. And I like the notion of al-
liance with a being more powerful than I against those 
forces in this world that sully life's dignity. 
III 
My wife stirs again and I know another day begins. 
I hug her to me and I conclude. Love is a miracle yet 
love most certainly exists. So I choose faith in the 
miracle of God's existence and activity in the world, 
too. 
Acting on that faith, I will rise today. I will perse-
vere. I will confront my employer. And I will save my 
job. Or I won't. And if I do, that will be good because 
I like it. And if I don't, that will be good because it 
will give me more time to do other things I like. Re-
gardless, I will have love's miracle. And it will propel 
me to join Yossarian, rowing to Sweden. Cl 
Shaman 
We bought seed packets from Woolworth's, 
walking past the bell-shaped bird cage 
where sea-green parakeets slept 
on a wooden dowel, legs locked, heads 
folded back. On our porch we planted 
morning glories, which twisted shut 
their amethyst petals against humid sun. 
My mother tamed this weed of a flower, 
trained it to trellice latticework. 
Pinched between thumb and pointer, 
blossoms popped with a squeeze 
as secret air rushed out. She always said 
that if I listened closely, they whisper 
where tendrils next would take the, 
the first name of the man I would marry. 
It never happened, words on midges' wings 
buzzing past my ears, hearing instead 
wind in our plum tree too old to bloom 
among milkweed pods where monarchs lay eggs. 
Martha M. Vertreace 
The Cresset 
Of Worth & Worry 
Linda Ferguson 
The freshmen have just recently 
arrived. University officials of ad-
missions, housing, financial aid, 
and health services know much 
about these students, individually 
and collectively. And I know some 
things no one else knows. At least 
I know a little about the 621 of 
them who over the summer sent 
me mail. As the person currently 
responsible for administering the 
Freshman Seminar program, I re-
ceive their requests for seminar 
placement. (The Seminar is a re-
quired course, but the topics-
about 30 each year-vary widely.) 
It is not surprising, nor necessar-
ily bad, that course descriptions 
promising films and field trips will 
draw well; nor is it surprising that 
topics related to mass culture at-
tract attention. The more abstract 
and overtly intellectual courses do 
fill , but slowly. (The card bearing 
one young woman's preference for 
a "popular culture" topic carried a 
wistful annotation in a different 
handwriting, indicating "father's 
choice.") 
The members of the class of 
1991, I can tell you, are mildly in-
terested in actors, animals, and art-
When she is not administering VU's 
Freshman Seminar program, Linda 
Ferguson is an Associate Professor in 
the Department of Music. 
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ists. They are somewhat more in-
terested in family relationships, 
food, and the future; they value 
mass communications and making 
peace. They are shamelessly uncon-
cerned with cultures and customs 
other than their own. They are ex-
ceedingly interested in sports, com-
edy, working, love, and money. 
Less predictable, but gratifying, is 
their considerable enthusiasm for 
ethical and theological issues. 
And less predictable yet is the 
overwhelming favorite: The Para-
normal. Their choices are based on 
descriptions provided by the pro-
fessors . The "paranormal" course, 
described in careful , non-sensa-
tional , academic language, promises 
to be rigorous. What caused 250 of 
the 621 respondents (about 40 per 
cent) to list it among their five 
choices, while only 172 (about 28 
per cent) expressed preferences for 
the "sports" topic? 
A few years back, The Chronicle of 
Higher Education reported results of 
a study conducted at a university in 
the east. Students were asked to list 
their worries about the courses they 
were commencing. Their teachers 
were asked to predict what the stu-
dents would list. Students' worries 
bore little relationship to the pro-
fessors ' imaginings. 
Teachers assumed that students 
were worried that the lectures 
would be boring, that the material 
would be obscure, that the grading 
would be harsh or unfair. Students, 
however, said they worried about 
whether they could handle the 
quantity of work assigned, whether 
the teacher would like them, and 
whether they would win approval 
of the other students. 
It is the question-what are you 
worried about?-more than the de-
tails of the study that affects my 
own approa,ch to the first day of 
my new courses and my thoughts 
about the freshmen whose requests 
I process. The eighteen-year-old 
arriving on campus is probably 
more concerned about whether his 
roommate will be tolerable and the 
dining hall food palatable than 
whether the curriculum that awaits 
will guide him to a coherent and 
worthy interpretation of the world. 
Is our job as teachers to make 
our worries their worries? To make 
them worry about what we worry 
about or at least what we think they 
should worry about? I am worried, 
and appalled, that this year's 
freshmen are more curious about 
psychokinesis than about poetry or 
progress or politics or people with 
different colored skin (nine of the 
641 listed the latter among their 
five choices). But if I teach only 
from the perspective of this worry, 
my students will be unlikely to 
share it. The disconnectedness of 
liberal learning from life as today's 
students live it (lamented loudly 
and at length in Allan Bloom's The 
Closing of the American Mind) will 
have no hope of reattachment. 
"What does it mean?" and "what 
does it mean to me?" are questions 
freshmen may not have learned to 
distinguish. Perhaps their worries 
seem removed from ours because 
they express them only in an im-
mediately personal way. Perhaps 
"will the teacher like me?" is the 
unlearned versiOn of "will the 
teacher understand what I mean?" 
Perhaps "will this be on the test?" is 
a feeble attempt to ask "is it neces-
sary for me to know this piece of 
information in order to understand 
what you intend to teach me next?" 
The classroom-every classroom 
regardless of "topic"-affords 
sanctuary in which to practice ex-
pressing what one means and inter-
preting what others mean; in which 
to participate in what J erome 
Bruner has called "the spirit of a 
forum, of negotiation, of the re-
creating of meaning"; in which to 
find wonder and joy in the enter-
prise of learning. If I can re-
member this, I won't worry so 




Written and directed by David 
Lynch, whose previous pictures in-
clude Eraserhead, The Elephant Man, 
and Dune, Blue Velvet has received 
nearly unanimous acclaim. It is 
probably the best-reviewed movie 
of the last year-and-a-half, uniting 
such grey eminences as Stanley 
Kauffman and Pauline Kael with 
younger critics like Steve Vineberg 
and a host of TV sages. 1 
To have pleased so many people 
of such different sensibilities is 
quite an accomplishment. However, 
while Blue Velvet is a wonderful an-
thology of praiseable bits and 
pieces, the question of how it works 
as a whole has not been faced, not 
yet. I want to suggest that this film 
is more vacuous, more regressive in 
its way than the standard studio 
products to which it is being favor-
ably compared. Blue Velvet is not so 
much an escape from the Eighties 
as a summation of this decade's 
stupidest impulses. 
One of the best moments in the 
film-a moment that suggests its 
potential strengths--occurs almost 
immediately. We see a middle-aged 
man watering the lawn; knees 
buckling, he collapses awkwardly 
onto a bursting, spurting hose 
Richard Maxwell rev~ews mov~es 
regularly in The Cresset and teaches 
in the Department of English at Valpa-
rmso University. 
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which not only suggests the stroke 
or hemorrhage he has just had but 
begins defining that mixed realm 
of sex and death which will prove 
to be Lynch's subject. 
The stroke victim turns out to be 
the father of Jeffrey Beaumont 
(Kyle MacLachlan), a college-age 
boy who returns home to take over 
the family hardware business while 
dad is in the hospital. Though not 
by any means alone-he has a bevy 
of female relatives whose twittering 
sympathy is played for laughs-Jef-
frey finds himself at something of a 
loss; paternal authority eliminated, 
or at least offstage, he will stumble 
into a new and frightening family. 
His father's collapse is visualized so 
that it serves as a bridge: in a 
dream-like way it sets the tone for 
Jeffrey's descent into the under-
world of this picturesque little 
town. 
Soon his descent begins in ear-
nest. Walking through a field he 
discovers a human ear. He drops 
off the ear at the local police sta-
tion, where a detective takes a calm 
but steady interest in it; later Jef-
frey runs into the detective's 
daughter Sandy (Laura Dern) and 
persuades her to help him investi-
gate a singer, Dorothy Vallens 
(Isabella Rossellini) who may have 
some connection with the develop-
ing mystery. 
While Sandy waits outside in a 
car, Jeffrey explores Dorothy's flat 
(she lives in the aptly-named Deep 
River apartment building); peeking 
out from a closet where he has 
taken refuge, he sees her enter and 
undress. Realizing that Jeffrey is 
watching, Dorothy drives him out 
of the closet and forces him to strip 
at knife point; they are interrupted 
by the arrival of Frank (Dennis 
Hopper) , the biggest pervert in 
1 I will quote from Kael's review in 
The New Yorker, September 22, 1986, 
Vineberg's in The Threepenny Review, 
Spring 1987, and David Chute's in 
Film Comment, October 1986. 
town. Jeffrey is getting in deep. 
Up to about this point Blue Velvet 
had me. Everything is off-key, just 
slightly, but the flat dialogue, the 
over-saturated colors, and the faux-
naif presentation of small-town life 
work together beautifully: in his 
odd staggering swings between hor-
ror and the everyday, Lynch is get-
ting somewhere strange very fast. 
The first serious problem is Den-
nis Hopper's performance as 
Frank. Hopper has thrived of late: 
playing against an inflatable doll in 
the disastrous River's Edge and 
against a champion basketball team 
in Hoosiers, he has managed to 
chew up more scenery than the av-
erage stagehog gets to consume in 
a lifetime. Lynch has Hopper do 
his standard weird-guy number; it 
doesn't suffice. The ravaged, sexy 
Rossellini is so convincing as 
Dorothy, the exploited masochist, 
that Hopper's brutal clowning 
palls; he's not committed enough-
! want to say not good enough-to 
be the personification of evil, the 
snake in the garden. He's an actor 
e~oying his own hamminess rather 
than a sadist enjoying the pain he 
inflicts on Dorothy and others. 
"Why are there people like 
Frank?" Jeffrey asks Sandy; he 
speaks in a quavering voice, ap-
propriate for one who has recently 
discovered the importance of 
theodicies, but the movie is seri-
ously out of joint in having him 
formulate this query: he might as 
well be asking, "Why are there 
people like Bozo?" for all the reso-
nance his question possesses. 
I should note that Frank never 
does live up to his evil potential, at 
least within the central action of 
Blue Velvet; during a crucial scene 
midway through the film he is al-
lowed a motive and a chance to in-
flict some sort of major erotic 
humiliation on Jeffrey. Lynch's 
imagination suddenly goes blank: 
all he can come up with is a pathe-
tic little kiss ritual, as if he too 
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realized that Frank, as interpreted 
by Hopper, is all bark and no bite. 
(I am reminded of Ron Moody's 
lovable Fagin from the film musical 
Oliver; however, Moody was at least 
a genuinely seductive devil.) 
If Lynch has serious difficulties 
with the representation of evil, so 
does he with the representation of 
good. Sandy, the gorgeous, golden 
virgin, is supposed to embody a 
kind of moral strength founded on 
mnocence and idealism. Laura 
Dern is winning in this part but 
Lynch does some odd things with 
her. Sandy's big scene is a conver-
sation she has with Jeffrey, while 
they sit in a car parked in front of 
a church. Behind them: glowing 
stained glass windows. Behind 
them: subdued organ musiC. 
Against these accompaniments, vis-
ual and aural, Sandy explains to 
her panic-stricken friend that the 
world will be saved by the arrival of 
a thousand robins, scattering love 
through all the world. 
People who like this film are gen-
erally anxious to explain, or ex-
plain away, this sequence. It's 
clearly not "camp," to use the Six-
ties term; Lynch is not constructing 
a piece of ironically-intended 
schlock which we then enjoy in a 
condescending way (less for content 
than for style). What's going on 
here then? Steve Vineberg writes: 
"as Laura Dern reads the lines, the 
cliche is so intensified that it be-
comes joyful, and the emotional 
color almost blinding." If we be-
lieve Vineberg, Lynch, the intuitive 
emotional filmmaker, is feeling his 
way into cliches, discovering the 
truth that still lies nestled at their 
heart despite the linguistic abuse of 
centuries. 
Pauline Kael would perhaps 
agree with this-she refers to 
Lynch as a Frank Capra of dream 
logic-but she adds a slightly dif-
ferent twist to her discussion of the 
robin scene. When Sandy babbles 
on so ingenuously, the point is that 
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she has seen "too many daytime 
soaps." The conversation in the car 
is intended to expose her illusions. 
Kael clinches her point by remind-
ing us that Blue Velvet ends (hap-
pily, it would seem) with a robin ar-
riving on a windowsill, a big juicy 
worm in its mouth. Nature is cruel, 
tooth and claw, etc.-not the be-
nign presence our golden girl finds 
it. 
Kael is a bit more convincing 
than Vineberg; however, that robin 
at the end is rather obviously 
mechanical, like a fugitive from the 
Tiki House at Disneyland. The fact 
is, Lynch has made so many cute 
jokes, has demonstrated his know-
ingness so many different ways, 
that Sandy's speech, her vision if 
you will, ends up having no real 
significance at all: it's idle doodling, 
what an extremely kind and patient 
critic might call "experimental." 
This wavering and indulgent at-
titude prevails through most of the 
film. Many of the later scenes are 
out-and-out disasters, such as the 
sequence where Dorothy turns up 
naked in front of Sandy's house 
just as Sandy and Jeffrey arrive by 
car. When Kael and Vineberg insist 
that Blue Velvet has some great 
comic scenes, they must be thinking 
of Jeffrey's difficulties at this mo-
ment (among others): how do you 
explain to your girlfriend's mom 
what an undressed woman with 
whom you are on first-name terms 
is doing in her living-room?2 
The problem is that Jeffrey, not 
to mention Lynch, makes no real 
attempt to solve this intriguing 
problem. The actors go through 
their paces as though they are try-
ing to do an eighteenth-century 
farce under the influence of sleep-
ing pills. Here, as so often, the ef-
2For Vineberg, this scene is "the fun-
niest and most reckless emotional 
apocalypse in any contemporary 
American movie." Kael affirms Blue 
Velvet's (partly) comic impact without 
citing examples. 
feet is neither witty, weird, nor 
even ... experimental. It's just un-
derdeveloped. 
There are some good moments 
in Blue Velvet, even after the main 
conflict has collapsed. Lynch gets 
his best performance from Dean 
Stockwell (the erstwhile child star 
of Anchors Aweigh). Stockwell plays 
Frank's friend Ben, a drug dealer 
who is holding Dorothy's little boy 
hostage in a sort of No Exit living 
room populated by stoned fat 
women. Made up like a vicious 
Pierrot, Stockwell lip-synchs Roy 
Orbison's melancholy tune "In 
Dreams." (Orbison sings about "the 
candy-colored clown they call the 
sandman"-good theme song for 
someone in Ben's profession.) 
Lip-synching has long had a role 
in our culture: think of the old 
American Bandstand-type shows, 
where a pop singer would appear 
in person and then mouth the words 
to his own hit song while the rec-
ord played and a passel of teen-
agers danced. The separation of 
body from voice is a form of self-
alienation with which we're all 
familiar, if not comfortable. Hear-
ing Orbison's deep, quavery voice 
while Stockwell mouths his words is 
a memorable sensation nonetheless: 
not quite American Bandstand, not 
quite daemonic possession. 
We can learn something from 
this sequence about the lugubrious 
parts of Fifties (and early Sixties) 
teenage lore: Orbison, Presley, 
James Dean, the whole overripe 
mess. We can also learn something 
about that falsest emotion, nostal-
gia, and its ability to give old idols 
new life. Lynch encourages us to 
cross a boundary line, one we may 
have sensed was there, between Or-
bison's weepy self-pity and the cold 
cruelty embodied here by Ben. 
Stockwell's cameo delivers what 
Blue Velvet so often promises: we 
start with a seemingly innocent sur-
face (the song) and find within it a 
self-indulgent corruption. The 
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problem is not that this sort of dis-
covery is hackneyed: in the context 
of 1980s Hollywood it is arguably 
brave and valuable. Lynch's diffi-
culty is just the opposite. For all 
we've heard about the no-holds-
barred quality of Blue Velvet, the 
film finally serves as a mechanism 
of repression, repression, more-
over, of a peculiarly mindless sort. 
Vineberg insists that Lynch wants 
to keep both idyll and nightmare 
"in sharp focus, insisting with the 
passion of a native surrealist that 
they can co-exist." But-as I've ar-
gued-idyll and nightmare are re-
solutely out of focus, morally if not 
literally. 
A comment from another ad-
mirer, David Chute, comes a little 
closer to the truth. "The picture 
toys with the notion that happiness 
is a matter of confining yourself 
stubbornly to the sunny surface of 
things, of not probing too deeply 
into their wormy innards." Chute 
has a point, although he doesn't 
follow it through. Lynch prevents 
himself from imagining fully the 
nature of good or evil; this self-
mystification allows him to work to-
wards a happy ending which he 
mocks and simultaneously wants us 
to believe, robins and all. He is not 
a naive surrealist so much as a 
practitioner of doublethink. 
At the end of Blue Velvet we're 
left with one hero and only one: 
the detective, Sandy's father, who 
can work within a corrupt milieu 
without being touched by it, who 
becomes-as Jeffrey could not-
our protector. It is typical of Blue 
Velvet that the thoughts, the experi-
ence, of our protector remain com-
pletely unavailable to us. Father 
knows best ... but only so long as 
he can remain a mysteriously dis-
tant, coolly benign figure . 
Peter Brooks once constructed a 
theory of melodrama according to 
which the absurdities of this form 
can be traced to confusion and anx-
iety about the disappearance of 
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moral absolutes (The M elodramatic 
Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, 
Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess, 
Yale, 1976). "We may legitimately 
claim that melodrama becomes the 
principal mode for uncovering, 
demonstrating, and making opera-
tive the essential moral universe in 
a post-sacred era." To put the 
point another way, in a culture 
where absolutes seem to have disin-
tegrated, a sense of morality can be 
restored through the operations of 
terror. Brooks applies his theory to 
works by Balzac, Henry James, and 
others. Melodrama in his sense is a 
term that includes high as well as 
low art; James' apparent rejections 
of melodrama contain themselves a 
melodramatic component. 
To some extent Lynch can be 
understood as a melodramatist-
and in these terms even his worst 
failures may seem excusable. Of 
course he can't imagine characters 
capable of embodying the forces of 
good and evil he strives to imagine; 
it is in the very nature of his cul-
tural dilemma that-no matter how 
hard he strives-his personification 
will remain inadequate, that the 
thing he is trying to express will re-
main partially unsaid. Of course he 
must revert to dependence on an 
arbitrary figure. The most desper-
ate, the most excessive of genres, 
melodrama necessarily works by 
these equivocal means. I suspect 
that some such argument lies be-
hind a good deal of the critical 
praise for Blue Velvet. 
In one crucial respect, however, 
the argument is unjustified. Balzac, 
Dickens, even James, indulged in 
the silliest of melodramatic conven-
tions but almost always in tandem 
with other energies. Lynch has re-
verted to a form of melodrama so 
pure that it makes thinking impos-
sible. Kael, Chute, and Vineberg 
either state or imply that Lynch 
doesn't need to think. Can they say 
the same of themselves or of the 
American polity at large? Cl 
My Nuclear 
Summer Vacation 
Paul H. Brietzke 
Summertime is a time for the 
refreshment of academics and, for 
me, a chance to continue writing a 
history of antitrust that progresses 
all too slowly. I took a break from 
this drudgery last summer to at-
tend a week-long Institute for pro-
fessors called "Regional Conflict 
and Global Security: The Nuclear 
Dimension." I hoped to reflect on 
this important topic in my future 
research and teaching, and I 
learned much from the academics, 
think-tank veterans, and former 
government officials who address-
ed the topic from a variety of 
perspectives and persuasions. 
But I confess that I also hoped 
to take advantage of the leisure 
opportunities freely available 
where the Institute was held: 
Madison, Wisconsin. No such luck. 
A very thick book of xeroxed 
readings arrived a month before 
the Institute began . In Madison we 
were kept strictly at our task from 
9:00 a.m. to 9 :00 p.m. each day, 
and fell into bed exhausted soon 
after. Somewhat resentful initially, 
Paul H. Brietzke, a regular Nation 
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I came away with something much 
more valuable than r and r. 
My initial reaction to the Insti-
tute was a "psychic numbing." I 
had not previously given much cre-
dence to this description (by Robert 
Jay Lifton) of typical reactions to 
the nuclear peril. Although I had 
read fairly widely on the subject, 
my nuke-think was always in-
terspersed with listening to the 
stereo and teaching and other 
everyday pleasures of a non-nu-
clear nature. Forced to concentrate 
on nukes, I woke up each morning 
grateful that Armageddon had not 
arrived during the night. Maybe 
you do this too on occasion or 
maybe you should, if for no other 
reason than to recognize how petty 
are most other annoyances. What 
follows is a summary of my reac-
tions to Institute presentations. 
The important message of the 
Institute dawned on me gradually: 
there is hope over nukes, even a 
closely-reasoned hope. How can 
this be, when we face a nuclear sys-
tem so weird and dangerous that 
not even Cap Weinberger or the 
Rand Corporation could have de-
signed it? The answer is that we 
had our eye on the wrong ball the 
whole time while searching for a 
technological quick-fix or hoping 
that the "experts" would know 
what to do. 
But experts persistently err while 
defining nuclear war as a 
technological rather than a political 
problem. Their approach presuma-
bly reflects Einstein's observation 
that physics is easier than politics. 
We know that war is diplomacy by 
other means (Clausewitz); the nuke 
is merely war and diplomacy by still 
more dangerous means. We can all 
better understand the nuclear 
menace as a species of politics and 
then reject the passive role assigned 
to us by the experts. We cannot 
allow ourselves to be kept in the 
dark while, at the same time, being 
blamed for the "micro-manage-
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ment" of military affairs which af-
fect us all. 
Expert assumptions about and 
analyses of weapons and their un-
derlying "scenarios" usually prove 
dubious on closer examination. 
The thrill of manipulating arcane 
concepts is at work, the secret 
handshake and the feeling of com-
petence that offer a dangerous illu-
sion of being in nuclear control. 
Our experts are full of arrogance 
and moral rectitude. Much of their 
logic and supporting evidence 
would be rejected as inadequate if 
they had come from an under-
graduate. 
Nuclear weapons are 
powerful but very blunt 
diplomatic instruments 
for the balancing and 
dividing of power that 
goes on constantly on a 
worldwide basis. 
Their expertise is not a good 
enough basis for your survival and 
mine. A cautious friendship with 
the Chinese turned out to be a bet-
ter solution than surrounding them 
with nukes, which is what Defense 
Secretaries Laird and Schlesinger 
urged. Relations with the dreaded 
Soviets could follow the same path; 
a modus vivendi exists to be built 
upon. 
Regrettably perhaps, nuclear 
arms control is all but irrelevant to 
peace; it merely serves to legitimate 
the process of acquiring new 
weapons. SALT limits on nukes did 
not interfere with what we or the 
Soviets wanted to do, and even a 
"theater" (small) nuke can be fif-
teen times more powerful than the 
Hiroshima bomb. Even if we ban 
the bomb, the knowledge and 
means of making it again quickly 
will remain forever. We may as-
sume that a full-scale conventional 
(non-nuclear) war would be a re-
play of World War II-terrible, but 
most people would survive. Yet the 
new conventional weapons are so 
powerful and cruel that their wide-
spread use would create the condi-
tions many associate with a nuclear 
war. 
The focus should thus be on pre-
venting and ameliorating conflicts 
rather than on the arms them-
selves. MX and Star Wars are 
dumb ideas but, their horrible cost 
aside, they merit a low priority in 
the debate. (Incidentally, Star Wars 
was termed SDI during the Insti-
tute, even by its opponents, which 
shows the power of governmental 
public relations efforts that would 
also turn the MX into the Peace-
keeper.) 
Nuclear weapons are powerful 
but very blunt diplomatic instru-
ments for the balancing and divid-
ing of power that goes on con-
stantly, worldwide. Pursuing a har-
mony of interests and an interna-
tional cooperation have little to do 
with this system of organized 
peacelessness achieved through 
militarization and, even in the U.S., 
internal repression. The assump-
tion that militarization can be built 
up selectively, incrementally, and 
without nukes, to achieve security 
for ourselves and our clients, is 
regularly belied by unplanned pro-
liferations of weapons and the at-
tendant repression. 
This is where our search for a 
cheap and easy fix in nuclear diplo-
macy has taken us. Nukes were 
supposed to decrease the probabil-
ity of war and to decrease expendi-
tures on defense and on war if it 
began. Otherwise the Europeans 
would have to maintain troops suf-
ficient to fight the Soviets in a con-
ventional war. World War III was 
projected to resemble a World War 
II plus nukes, and conflicts which 
did not fit this model-the Iraq-
Iran War, for example-were 
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either fuelled or forgotten. Only 
recently have we sensed that our 
situation is more like the prelude to 
World War I: an oddball flashpoint 
could very well lead up to the Big 
One. 
Nuclear strategy now leaves us 
with a long series of prisoners' di-
lemmas; each of us is the prisoner, 
the hostage to what almost any 
country may do in an interdepen-
dent but nuclear world. The arms 
race now manages us by ruling out 
most potentially-useful ideas and 
solutions to conflict, yet it does not 
matter much whether or not we 
build weapons of various types. We 
feel the need to act tough, while 
perhaps recognizing that doing so 
may be a step towards Armaged-
don. 
This is why Reagan's fondness 
for "sending a message" devoid of 
constructive content-in Nicaragua, 
Libya, and who knows where or 
what next-is so dangerous. We 
cannot know what the Soviets, et al. 
will perceive in our actions. They 
do not consider themselves the 
"bad guys" of some old cowboy 
movie, who must back down after 
we slap them around a bit. We can-
not be sure that the Soviets will fo-
ment the problem for which we are 
creating the solution, but we can 
bet that our solution will become 
their problem. They will then 
create a solution which becomes 
our problem, and so on, which is 
what we call deterrence. 
There is far too little public dis-
cussion and understanding of de-
terrence, the key concept that, 
more than anything else, reflects 
the poverty of our imagination con-
cerning nukes and strategy gener-
ally. Deterrence assumes an ethno-
centric and hyperrational, Bentham-
ite calculation of war's pains and 
pleasures. It supposedly increases 
the pain (through, e.g., escalation) 
and reduces the pleasure (through, 
e.g., the scorched-earth policy that 
nukes make so likely), while ignor-
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ing the irrationalities and accidental 
features that shape so much of his-
tory (e.g., the improbably long 
series of coincidences we remember 
as Adolf Hitler). If deterrence has 
failed so spectacularly in our penol-
ogy, if the same crooks keep re-
turning to jail, how can we expect 
deterrence to work under an inter-
national lawlessness where mis-
behavior is so often rewarded so 
well? 
"Effective" deterrence means giv-
ing up democratic, and even presi-
dential, controls over weapons and 
actions. "Better Dead than Red" 
can eventually become "Better Red 
than Red," as we imitate the enemy 
until he becomes us. (If this sounds 
fanciful, consider what has hap-
pened to the Israelis in recent 
years.) 
Perhaps the main defect 
of the idea of deterrence 
is that it offers no 
solutions once nuclear 
war begins. Yet we deem 
it a part of "thinking 
the unthinkable." 
Third World peoples and, in-
creasingly, Western Europeans 
realize that the nuclear deterrence 
"umbrella" is quite small. We will 
not knowingly risk our population 
to save theirs, and the proliferation 
that supposedly augments their 
self-defense thus proceeds apace. A 
superpower stalemate encourages 
instability and conflict in the Third 
World, as each superpower gives in 
to the desire to flex its muscles by 
egging on client-states and "libera-
tion" movements. 
"No more Koreas" has gone the 
way of the more ennobling desire 
to "make the world safe for democ-
racy." Perhaps the main defect of 
deterrence is that it offers no solu-
tions once nuclear war begins. Yet 
we deem it a part of "thinking the 
unthinkable." 
I have not discussed the Soviets 
much, for the simple reason that it 
is easier to influence our govern-
ment than it is to influence theirs. 
But we can take some comfort 
from the notion that, by and large, 
Soviet behavior is more cautious 
and conservative than ours. We are 
the only ones to have used nukes 
for other than diplomatic purposes: 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which 
seemed to flow logically from the 
1942 Allied decision to bomb civil-
ian populations. 
Each significant technological es-
calation has come from us rather 
than the Soviets: the A-bomb, the 
H-bomb, MIRVed warheads, and 
now Star Wars. So far, the Soviets 
have backed down in direct con-
frontations-the Berlin and Cuban 
Missile Crises, for example-while 
we have always left open the option 
of nuclear escalation. In contrast to 
our behavior over Vietnam, the 
Soviets in Afghanistan have not 
harmed Pakistani dissidents or 
bombed or invaded Pakistan in hot 
pursuit. 
Soviet strategy is devoted to win-
ning a conventional war without 
using nukes, although chemical and 
biological weapons may be used; 
NATO is committed to using nukes 
if its key positions are overrun. 
The Soviets keep their nuclear 
weapons at a lower state of readi-
ness than ours because they fear a 
loss of control. For example, the 
KGB keeps most nuclear missile 
warheads and stores them apart 
from the launchers controlled by 
the military. Our electronic failsafe 
mechanisms may be better than 
theirs, but ours will be removed 
during a time of high alert-the 
time when they are needed most. 
These propositions may irritate 
Americans who want to believe that 
we are more cautious and pacific 
than the Soviets. But we would all 
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presumably agree on the need to 
improve our performance and our 
chances of survival, by working to 
cut the paths to war. A deliberate 
nuclear war out of the blue is too 
unlikely to worry about, although 
thinking about this particular un-
thinkable regularly serves to justify 
increases in our defense budget. 
There is no technological 
fix for the most likely 
path to nuclear war: a 
political decision to 
initiate actions without 
predicting their 
consequences correctly. 
An accidental nuclear war is a 
distinct possibility, however. The 
actions and reactions of both sides 
are so interlinked that we could 
have an electronic version of World 
War I. A 75 cent computer chip 
may fail and prompt a nuclear war, 
or a computer program-which 
cannot be debugged under "realis-
tic" conditions-may run amok. 
There have been some 1,500 false 
alarms since America's various alert 
systems were built. These alarms 
have been properly disregarded, 
occasionally with only seconds to 
spare, but a serious crisis could 
cause an ambiguity to be inter-
preted in favor of launch. 
There is a useful but very limited 
role for a technological fix here, al-
though increased technological 
sophistication (e.g., Star Wars) au-
tomatically multiplies the oppor-
tunities for accident. Improved 
consultative devices like the inde-
pendent monitoring and warning 
system proposed by the French, 
staffed by the Soviets and our-
selves, seem a good idea. 
There is no technological fix for 
the most likely path to nuclear war: 
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a political decision to initiate ac-
tions without predicting their con-
sequences correctly, an escalation 
taken on the assumption that the 
other side will back down~ Conflict 
and escalation truncate choices, 
presenting political leaders (or mil-
itary commanders, if civilian con-
trol breaks down) with either/or de-
cisions-prisoners' dilemmas with a 
ratchet effect, as in the "use 'em or 
lose 'em" syndrome. 
Naval warfare, for example, 
creates the overwhelming pressure 
to fire first. A single hit can sink a 
nuclear-capable ship, which is thus 
not made subject to elaborate civil-
ian controls. Anyone with a Silk-
worm or an Exocet can thus help 
steer naval battles in a nuclear di-
rection. 
The only real protection we have 
is the "firebreak" that lies between 
conventional and nuclear war. It is 
composed of nothing more than 
the belief that nuclear war is im-
moral and the pragmatic sense that 
we do not know how to fight one 
with any degree of safety. It is 
perhaps Reagan's major sin that he 
has shrunk this firebreak by trying 
to blur the distinction between con-
ventional and nuclear war. 
If an unthinking, step-by-step es-
calation to nuclear war occurs, the 
most likely venue is somewhere in 
the Third World. Europe is tense 
but fairly stable, while there is 
much recent conflict in the Middle 
East, South and Southeast Asia, 
and southern Africa. (Latin 
America is a ''nuclear-free zone," 
and tended to be disregarded dur-
ing the Institute for this reason.) 
The proliferation of conventional 
weapons and nuclear technologies 
creates a clear and present danger 
of exacerbating and then escalating 
regional conflicts, conflicts into 
which Soviets and Americans are 
all too easily drawn. 
Third World military expendi-
tures now total more than expendi-
tures there on health and educa-
tion combined. The Third World's 
big spenders perpetuate underde-
velopment and experience conflict 
as causes and effects of militariza-
tion and internal repression. Yet 
the ensuing conflicts appear to jus-
tify earlier weapons acquisitions. 
(The top eight countries account 
for more than 50 per cent of 
worldwide expenditures on arms 
imports; they are, in order, the 
conflict-prone Iraq, Egypt, Iran, 
Syria, Libya, India, Israel, and 
Vietnam.) 
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There was much else in Institute 
presentations which exceeds the 
scope of this column: an American 
feminist perspective, and illuminat-
ing details and revealing histories 
of regional conflicts and super-
power responses. Particularly dis-
turbing is the exacerbation of con-
flicts by religious fundamentalisms: 
Islamic, of course, but also Jewish, 
Maronite Christian (Lebanon), and 
even Hindu and Sikh--evolutions 
away from Nehru's secular state 
which began when Indira Gandhi 
discovered the power of communal 
voting. 
We must prepare to deal with 
their and our fundamentalisms 
peacefully, and with the possibility 
that Lebanon is the wave of the fu-
ture. We must also lift the burden 
of history before we can lift the 
burden of weapons, by seeking to 
understand the dynamics and con-
sciousness that have led to the 
present morass . A revived Wil-
sonianism, an unpreparedness at 
Pearl Harbor, and the appeasement 
at Munich still dominate our think-
ing and are badly in need of updat-
ing and revision. Reagan seems to 
think that he is standing up to Sta-
lin. 
So many problems; what can be 
done? If George Orwell was cor-
rect, we must speak and write 
clearly before we can think clearly 
about nukes. One Institute lecturer 
carefully underscored the obfusca-
tory nature of our nuclear lan-
guage. Consider, for example, the 
reversal of sentient and insentient 
matter that operates to conceal the 
fact that war is a contest of injury 
to human bodies. 
Nukes are personified-they live 
in "families," become "disabled," 
and "kill" each other ("fratricide," 
if they are from the same family)-
while people are depersonalized 
when, for example, their death in a 
nuclear exchange is called "collat-
eral damage." Having built a bomb, 
India is said to have lost its nuclear 
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"virginity." New Zealanders are 
made to sound foolish when their 
banning of our nuclear-capable 
ships is described as "an attempt to 
regain their virginity." Graphic im-
ages are linked to loose public-rela-
tions talk, and euphemisms take us 
far from reality in an effort to 
make us love the inherently unlov-
able bomb. 
So many problems; what 
can be done? If George 
Orwell was correct, we 
must speak and write 
clearly about nukes 
before we can think 
clearly about them. 
We must think pragmatically and 
morally about the bomb to over-
come the "crackpot realism" (C. 
Wright Mills) which too often pre-
vails. Methodists and the Catholic 
bishops are doing a good job, and 
we may want to help the Lutheran 
Peace Fellowship gain influence. 
Scientists must devise their own 
Hippocratic Oath, enforced by the 
opprobrium of colleagues if noth-
ing else. Each weapons system is a 
reflection of our social system, of 
what we apparently want and will 
pay for. If you do not like the re-
flection of yourself in the weaponry 
mirror, work for change. 
Our undemocratic national secu-
rity state breaks down periodically, 
over Vietnam and the Iran-Contra 
fiasco. Breakdown offers an oppor-
tunity for Congress and even ordi-
nary citizens to reassert a measure 
of sanity and control, and to begin 
building a consensus. It is simply 
not true that peace groups have 
no interest in security and that 
hawks do not care for peace. They 
differ over perceptions of where 
danger lies, and their differences 
can be narrowed with careful 
analyses of accurately-reported 
facts . 
Each president's feet must regu-
larly be held to the fire over 
foreign and arms policy. They 
must all be stopped from thinking 
unilaterally, given the dangerous 
weapons our rivals hold. Each ad-
ministration must be forced to 
build on a national-security pro-
gram which adequately reflects na-
tional interests and aspirations. The 
firebreak between conventional and 
nuclear war must be strengthened; 
firebreaks against the escalation of 
regional conflicts must be created. 
Our relations with particular coun-
tries must be thought through care-
fully , so that we need not respond 
to events with ad hoc frolics. 
We also need to rethink our pa-
tron-client relations with Third 
World countries, relations which 
often echo the feudal politics on 
which they are based. To do this, 
we must come to terms with public 
nationalisms and yearnings for so-
cial democracy in the Third World. 
The failure to understand these 
movements leaves us dealing with 
tiny elites who practice the repres-
sion and the corrupt state 
capitalism that guarantee their 
downfall, and that offer much pub-
lic relations ammunition for the 
Soviets in the meantime. If we 
know the endpoint-majority rule 
in South Africa, some territory for 
Israelis in the Middle East-we 
must work at peaceful means to ac-
celerate the transition. Finally, we 
must patiently re-educate our mili-
tary so that they prevent wars 
rather than merely win them. 
All concerned citizens should 
have the opportunity to go through 
something like the Institute at 
Madison. Most will not have this 
opportunity, and I thus potted up 
my reactions to the Institute as an 
imperfect substitute. No issue is 
more worth thinking about and act-
ing upon, and I wish you both the 
concern and the joy of it. Cl 
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But Will It Play 
In New York? 
John Steven Paul 
Last spring I proposed to the ed-
itor of this journal that I review 
next season's Broadway hits while 
they were in out-of-town tryouts. 
Besides, I said, with super-saver 
fares, a trip to London would cost 
well under a thousand dollars, in-
cluding a pub crawl or two. No way. 
Knowing my editor's political in-
clinations (I read In Luce Tua, too), 
I suggested that the primary pur-
pose of the trip would be to cover 
those crucial days leading up to 
Maggie Thatcher's historic third-
term victory, and then to see a bit 
of theatre on the side. "As long as 
you keep your expenses within the 
range of your column fee," he said, 
" ... and see if you can get an in-
terview with Kinnock." 
So, confident that my in-flight 
cocktails would be fully subsidized, 
I journeyed to the New York 
theatre's most important out-of-
town try-out spot: London (Eng.). 
En route our little 747 passed two 
huge British military transport 
planes, straining to stay aloft. They 
may have been on a resupply mis-
sion to the Falklands, but my guess 
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is that they were conveying parts of 
the scenic apparatus for the New 
York engagements of Les Miserables 
and Starlight Express. 
Starlight Express is Andrew Lloyd 
Webber's Uesus Christ Superstar, 
Evita, Cats) tribute to popular cul-
ture. If you can imagine a combi-
nation Ringling Brothers, roller 
derby, and rock concert set in a 
railroad roundhouse spiraling 
above your head, then you deserve 
the opportunity to experience Star-
light Express. The plot won't over-
tax your intellectual resources, un-
less you thought "The Little Engine 
That Could" was a difficult text. 
It is difficult not to be amazed by 
the performances of the actor-ath-
letes who impersonate locomotives 
and railroad cars. Simultaneously 
singing, dancing, and speeding on 
roller skates around a triple-deck 
track, they try futilely to keep from 
being absorbed by the scenic spec-
tacle and drowned out by electronic 
amplification. 
In the London production, black 
actors play the little steam engine 
and members of his family. Ulti-
mately, the little steamer defeats 
the super trains and bullet trains 
from France and Japan. These 
locomotives are played by whites. 
Political message? Unfortunately, 
all the locomotives are played by 
men, while women play dining cars 
and cabooses. Social message? In-
explicably, divine aid comes to the 
little steam engine in the form of a 
starship-cum-locomotive, riding the 
rails of the title tune. This mysteri-
ous, omnipotent force is the "Star-
light Express." Religious message? 
Starlight Express is excessive but 
not pretentious. For pretentious-
ness you go to the Royal Shake-
speare Company's production of 
Les Miserables at the Palace Theatre. 
The size of the authorial committee 
that fashioned Victor Hugo's epic 
novel of 1861 into a musical makes 
it impossible to list its members 
here. Like Starlight Express, Les Mis-
erables has b~en directed by Trevor 
Nunn, whose directorial signature 
currently insures the success of any 
show produced on either side of 
the pond. 
In Paris, London, and now New 
York, "Les Mis," as the in-crowd 
call it, has become a must-see for 
those who want to be counted 
among the internationally chic. But 
theatre-goers who require more 
than super-spectacular size in a 
show may well be disappointed. 
Even the RSC's superb perfor-
mance cannot help the music, 
which is simple-minded, thin, and 
repetitive. And, as in nearly all mu-
sicals now, the amplification dis-
torts rather than enhances the ac-
tors' natural voices. 
Beware the production whose 
program is stuffed with notes 
clarifying the plot: it means the 
play can't speak for itself. Despite 
the many program notes, I found 
Hugo's compelling saga of Jean 
Valjean, Inspector Javert, Fantine, 
and Cosette difficult to follow in 
the "Les Mis" adaptation. The mas-
sive production nearly drowned the 
plot, and distanced us utterly from 
the characters which Hugo offered 
up for our empathy. Unlike Trevor 
Nunn's captivating Nicholas Nickleby, 
"Les Mis" promotes no central 
character with the ethos, pathos, 
and charm of Charles Dickens' 
Nicholas. We encounter Hugo's 
Jean Valjean as more part of the 
spectacle than half of the conflict. 
Even under the masterful manipu-
lation of Nunn, the illusion fails to 
take shape. 
Nunn and his production team 
have filled the gaps in the script 
with massive scenery and a cast of 
thirty. Some of the scenery is start-
ingly impressive (as are the produc-
tion costs) and some of the effects 
are magically theatrical. When, for 
instance, the police detective Javert 
jumps from a bridge to his suicidal 
death, the bridge flies up and away 
from the actor and lighting trans-
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forms the stage floor into a swirling 
eddy. But it's hardly worth a trip to 
London to see scenery--or even to 
New York, where the show prom-
ises to play for a long time. 
By almost any measure, the 
Royal Shakespeare Company leads, 
even dominates, the English 
theatre. The company, founded in 
1961, is based at the Royal Shake-
speare Theatre in Stratford-upon-
Avon. While producing Shake-
spearean plays for the nation is one 
of its principal missions, the com-
pany is equally famous for its pro-
ductions of the entire range of 
world drama, and for new plays. 
With its three theatres in Stratford-
upon-Avon, two theatres at the 
Barbican Center in London, and 
the various spaces it hires on a tem-
porary basis, there is almost always 
a landmark RSC production avail-
able to the foreign visitor. 
And increasingly, the RSC takes 
its plays on global tours. The pro-
duction of Les Liaisons Dangereuses, 
by Christopher Hampton, pre-
miered at The Other Place, the 
RSC's flexible space in Stratford, 
moved on to the Pit theatre at the 
Barbican Center, and then, under 
independent management, to The 
Ambasadors Theatre in the West 
End. Last summer, it too arrived in 
New York. 
Les Liaisons Dangereuses is Chris-
topher Hampton's dramatization of 
the epistolary novel by an 
eighteenth-century soldier, inven-
tor, and revolutionary, Choderlos 
de Laclos. Set in the decade prior 
to the Revolution, Les Liaisons 
traces the salacious saunterings of 
Le Vicomte de Valmont and his 
compatriot La Marquise de Mer-
teuil. For Laclos, the two 
epitomized a segment of the 
French aristocracy that had little 
other than seduction, conquest, 
ravishment, and ruination to oc-
cupy its time. 
To retrace the labyrinthine plot 
would only get us all hopelessly 
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tangled up in noms de famille. Suf-
fice it to say that Vicomte and the 
Marquise treat virginity and chas-
tity not as virtues, or even as mat-
ters of consequence, but as tokens 
in a game to be won or lost, traded, 
protected, forfeited or discarded as 
the changing circumstances of play 
dictate. That such virtues are treas-
ured by persons less adept at the 
game than they is cause for little 
more than an occasional exchange 
of quizzical glances. Ultimately, the 
two desire each other. They resist 
the impulse to declare their affec-
tion lest such declaration bring one 
under the power of the other. 
Lately, and happily, 
there is word that 
Breaking the Code, by 
Hugh Whitemore, will 
be opening at the Kennedy 
Center in Washington. 
It is nearly as gratifying, and less 
dangerous for them, to exercise 
their power over other, weaker 
subjects. At the behest of the Mar-
quise, the Vicomte cooly deceives 
and deflowers a teenage bride-to-be 
so that the Marquise can have her 
revenge on the bride's intended, a 
man who had once had the best of 
the Marquise. And for his own 
amusement, the Vicomte strives to 
spoil the virtue of the most reli-
giously chaste wife in France. 
Their skillful and stylish schem-
ing-a monstrous blend of cool 
moral detachment and heated com-
petitive engagement-mark the 
Vicomte and the Marquise as more 
than merely despicable specimens 
of a decadent class, but as incarna-
tions of a parasitic evil that must be 
eradicated. For a good portion of 
the performance, their outra-
geously cynical attitudes and callous 
actions tickle the audience. But 
when the end is near, the young 
girl ruined, and the good wife com-
promised, the warm yellow sun-
shine streaming through the win-
dows turns cool and the creamy 
bed linens go grey. The chuckling 
in the auditorium wanes, and even 
the Vicomte seems fazed by the 
corruption of it all. By then, the 
shouts of the J acobins can almost 
be heard in the distant half-decade 
hence, and they are welcome. 
Lindsay Duncan and Alan 
Rickman, as the Marquise and the 
Vicomte, move silkily about high-
ceilinged salons and bed chambers. 
Designer Bob Crowley has done 
them up all in buff and cream and 
blonde wood, masking the black-
ness of Valmont and Merteuil's 
machinations. The rooms are inun-
dated by cloth: tousled bed cloth-
ing, hastily discarded lingerie, and 
layers of lavish costume. Sub-
merged in all the fabric are the 
weapons and the spoils of the sex 
wars. Yet, though layers and layers 
of costume come off in the fray, 
there finally is no flesh to be seen 
in this fleshly play. 
Lately, and happily, there is 
word that Breaking the Code, by 
Hugh Whitemore, will be opening 
at the Kennedy Center in 
Washington, moving subsequently, 
one hopes, to New York. Derek 
Jacobi will play the leading role of 
Alan Turing. 
Breaking the Code is comprised of 
seventeen scenes in the life of Alan 
Turing. Turing, a mathematician, 
served with the British Foreign Of-
fice's code-breaking team at Bletch-
ley Park during the Second World 
War. Turing managed to break the 
Germans' "Enigma" code-against, 
by his own estimate, 50,000-to-one 
odds-by inventing a machine to 
survey and test "thousands of mil-
lions" of coded permutations in a 
matter of hours. As a researcher at 
Manchester University after the 
war, he invented the digital com-
puter, the "electronic brain." 
Turing was a homosexual who 
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lived a relatively unguarded private 
life. Thus, of course, he broke the 
English social and moral codes as 
well as the German Enigma code. 
After his term of service, the Gov-
ernment valued Turing and feared 
him. In the authorities' view, his 
status as a former intelligence offi-
cer made him a walking vault of 
top-secret security information; his 
homosexual lifestyle made him un-
trustworthy, unstable, and an easy 
mark for blackmailers. 
It was determined that Turing 
would have to be "kept in touch." 
If he did not regularly contact the 
authorities, they would maintain 
surveillance of him. But Turing's 
freedom meant more to him than 
his life. He committed suicide in an 
R.A.F. hanger on June 7, 1954. 
Whitemore based his play on the 
book Alan Turing, The Enigma by 
Andrew Hodges, and brought to it 
the sharpness and clarity of a 
documentary life. The scenes are 
answers to a question: how did this 
enigma named Alan Turing come 
to be? And so we are shown the 
spectacle of a consciousness being 
formed, of a mind being program-
med. 
Formative influences include an 
intense friendship with a school-
mate and kindred intellectual spirit, 
and the friend's untimely death at 
school of tuberculosis; the pro-
nouncements of an anti-science 
school teacher; a mother's failure 
to demonstrate affection; philo-
sophic and scientific maxims passed 
on to him by colleagues and men-
tors; even the movie Snow White 
and the Seven Dwarfs. 
Whitemore frames the play with 
a police investigation . Turing's 
Manchester apartment has been 
burglarized by an occasional lover 
and his accomplice. Turing reports 
the crime to the police, though he 
must know that the investigation 
will expose his lifestyle. When the 
police discover Turing's connection 
to the burglar, he is dispatched to 
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prison on a charge of gross inde-
cency. 
It is Derek Jacobi's brilliant per-
formance that draws this loosely 
structured, episodic script together. 
The scenes from Turing's life cover 
the years between age seventeen 
and forty-two. Without character 
make-up or significant costume 
change, Jacobi communicates the 
subtle physical and behavioral 
changes that accompany matura-
tion. 
Jacobi grounds Turing's essential 
restlessness, diffidence, arrogance, 
and pre-occupation in a single 
habitual action: fingernail biting. 
Throughout the evening, the 
actor's hands are rarely removed 
from his mouth. Combined with his 
stuttering, and the wandering of 
his glances away from those who 
would fix his attention, the nailbit-
ing is exhausting to watch. But 
Jacobi's artistic magnetism prevents 
the spectator from looking away. 
Breaking the Code is a play about 
reason and reasoning. Appropriate-
ly, Jacobi's intellectually acute per-
formance is supported by an ut-
terly stark and razor-sharp produc-
tion, directed by Clifford Williams. 
Williams, like many English direc-
tors, has been strongly influenced 
by Brechtian theatre practice. The 
audience is kept alert by various 
theatrical means. The illumination 
is white; the performers remain at 
the sides of the stage when they are 
not in action, and when they come 
out for a scene they are plucked 
out of a vast open stage space and 
Dialogue of an Aged 
Couple at Sorrento 
HE: There will be neither songs nor castanets 
In the still night that follows the long day. 
No leaf will stir. No telltale swirl of dust 
Will touch the darkened earth where sunlight lay. 
SHE: And will there be no music from the fountain 
Whose silver note outlasts the dryest season? 
Will there be silence where the water flowed? 
Will lizards hold their breath without a reason? 
HE: Reason enough that everything grows weary 
Of sun and burning heat that cracks the earth. 
We weary also from our day of birth 
And wearily we wait and long for darkness. 
SHE: Today a ray of light slipped through that vine, 
Touched a cool stone within the thickest shade, 
Changed the dark moss to glowing emerald green. 
One dewdrop flashed. The deepening shadow 
Made flash of gold and blue seem ever brighter. 
The night may come, but I am not afraid. 
Raymond P. Fischer 
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set in high contrast to the dark 
metal walls. The furnishings are 
very spare and have been selected 
and placed only because they 
clarify action. After a good while 
one comes to realize that the 
vaguely-defined setting is actually 
the airplane hanger where Turing 
will commit suicide. 
Turing was obsessed with 
the idea that everything 
in nature could be 
rationally understood and 
mechanically calculated. 
Alan Turing was obsessed with 
the idea that everything in Nature 
could be rationally understood and 
mechanically calculated. While he 
could solve the riddle of the 
Enigma Code, he was not able to 
bring about acceptable congruence 
between his thinking self and his 
feeling self. He sought pure intel-
lectuality, but he could not be free 
of his own desires. At the moment 
he took his life, conjectures White-
more, he was seeking to know if 
mental processes might continue 
free of a living body. At the last, 
Jacobi stood, as near to pure intel-
lect as a corporeal being could be, 
alone in that vast space, con-
templating an apple tainted with 
cyanide. 
I could not end this survey of 
London's theatre in the spring of 
1987 without mentioning yet 
another Trevor Nunn-Royal 
Shakespeare Company production. 
This is The Fair Maid of the West, 
written by Thomas Heywood some-
time around 1600. It plays at Lon-
don's Mermaid Theatre and will 
surely not come to New York. This 
is a pity, because The Fair Maid is 
one of the most joyous theatre ex-
periences that can be had any-
where. 
The play owes its success partly 
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to a more than adequate story of 
one Bess Bridges, who ships out on 
the high seas to rescue her lover 
from untold catastrophes: pirates, 
Spaniards, Mohammedans, in short 
every bugaboo that threatened the 
psychological peace and security of 
Englishmen in the seventeenth cen-
tury. The old play has been given 
new and delightful music by Shaun 
Davey. The RSC actors, of course, 
are at their best in an English clas-
SIC. 
More than plot, characters, lan-
guage, music, or spectacle, the 
Nunn-RSC Fair Maid of the West 
succeeds by embracing its audience 
and inducing it to share in the act 
of creation. As we entered the Mer-
maid, its stage gotten up to repre-
sent a tavern, we were served ale 
by members of the acting company. 
From that point on, our fortunes 
were bound up with those ale-quaf-
fers on stage. And when a poor lit-
tle touring company arrived at the 
tavern and set up for a stuffy pro-
duction of Henry V, we joined with 
the tavern's patrons in booing 
Shakespeare down and calling for 
our favorite-little did we know it 
then-The Fair Maid! 
Throughout the Mermaid eve-
ning, we enjoyed what theatre his-
torians have singled out as the 
hallmark of London Theatre in the 
time of Elizabeth I and James 1: 
the oneness of actors and audience 
as participants in the theatre event. 
It is a testimony to Trevor 
Nunn's versatility, I hope, and not 
to his bad judgment, that he could 
have directed The Fair Maid, Les 
Mis, and Starlight Express. Audi-
ences at the latter shows were re-
moved so far and by so many 
forces from the performers that 
they might as well have been 
watching a screen. (In fact, signifi-
cant parts of Starlight Express are on 
video screens.) In any case, I note 
that London, try-out town that it 
may be, still keeps its best shows at 
home. Cl 
Review Essay 
How Do Lutherans 




St. Louis: Concordia Publishing 
House. 1,974 pp. $34.95. 
Every October Lutherans cele-
brate the Reformation and thereby 
annually raise the issue of Lu-
theran self-understanding and 
identity. It all began-so we remind 
ourselves-when in the context of 
the reigning medieval penitential 
piety Martin Luther discovered 
evangelically-motivated repentance 
and faith in the Gospel. The Gos-
pel of the grace of God through 
faith in Jesus Christ thus also be-
came a critical principle against the 
abuses of theology and piety in the 
medieval church. In the ensuing 
controversies which led to his ex-
communication from the papal 
church Luther found himself rely-
ing increasingly upon the Bible 
against the claims of the Church 
and its councils. But when con-
Walter Keller, who has written fre-
quently for The Cresset over the years, 
is Professor of Theology at Valparaiso 
University. 
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fronted later by the more radical 
reformation movements, Luther's 
appeal to the Bible became more 
nuanced historically and 
ecclesiologically. 
A Lutheran understanding of the 
Bible, therefore, is enormously 
complex and notoriously elusive, as 
the history of Lutheranism in this 
country during the 1970s amply 
documents. It is not always clear, 
nor is there any unanimity on, how 
best to adjudicate the many claims 
that are made by evangelical con-
cerns, ecclesiological concerns, and 
historical and critical concerns. One 
matter is quite clear, however; it is 
utterly naive to traffic in pious 
sloganeering with phrases like, 
"Bible alone," or its close kin, 
"Scripture, not tradition." The 
plain, though often unacknowl-
edged, fact is that the Bible never 
did stand alone; it has always been 
embedded in some supporting con-
text and carried along in one or 
another tradition, whether eccle-
siastical or cultural. 
The question of a Lutheran re-
lationship to the Bible is raised 
again by the appearance of The 
Concordia Self-Study Bible (CSB) last 
year. "The Concordia Self-Study 
Bible is a Luthern (sic!) edition of 
the NIV Study Bible." So reads the 
first sentence of the Foreword to 
the CSB. The impulse to publish 
such an edition goes back to the 
growing popularity of the New In-
ternational Version (NIV) of the 
Bible. It was rapidly commending 
itself around the English-speaking 
world as an excellent translation, 
not only for classroom work, but 
also for devotional and liturgi-
cal purposes, in the process be-
coming attractive as well to large 
numbers of Lutherans, who also 
used it for personal and corporate 
worship. 
Then the NIV Study Bible (NSB) 
was published in 1985, furnished 
with 20,000 notes to the text, intro-
ductions and outlines to each of the 
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books of the Bible, 82,000 cross 
references, plus charts, maps, es-
says, and comprehensive indexes. 
Altogether it represented a splen-
did achievement of conservative 
evangelical biblical scholarship, 
placed into the service of lay Bible 
study. But for all that it posed a 
problem for Lutherans; for, al-
though the NSB draws upon the 
heritage of the Protestant Reforma-
tion, it is not at certain crucial 
points Lutheran in its orientation. 
The CSB addresses itself to that 
problem. As the Foreword ex-
plains: "The notes have been 
edited and revised to provide a dis-
tinctively Lutheran emphasis." 
The CSB shares with the NSB 
something of a Protestant embar-
rassment that a study Bible should 
be needed at all. It is the tender 
conscience formed by the Protes-
tant slogan "Bible alone" which 
provokes CSB, following NSB, to 
ask: "Why a study Bible when the 
NIV text itself is so clearly written? 
Surely there is no substitute for the 
reading of the text itself; nothing 
people write about God's word can 
be on a level with the word itself. 
Further, it is the Holy Spirit 
alone-not fallible human beings-
who can open the human mind to 
the divine message." 
The CSB, again echoing the 
NSB, then justifies a study Bible by 
stating that "the Spirit also uses 
people to explain God's word to 
others," appealing to the experi-
ence of the Ethiopian in Acts 8:31, 
who was unable to understand the 
Bible until Philip interpreted for 
him. However that incident does 
more than merely allow for a study 
guide; it argues quite forcefully 
against the slogan "Bible alone" by 
pointing to the necessity of an ac-
credited, Spirit-filled guide to the 
Scriptures. And even though the 
NSB is the work of a trans-denomi-
national team of biblical scholars, 
all of whom confess the authority 
of the Bible as God's infallible word 
to humanity, and who have sought 
to provide clarity, appreciation, and 
insight into that word, it still does 
not come out Lutheran enough. 
Neither the Bible alone, nor the 
Bible as interpreted by the commit-
ted Protestant scholars of the NSB, 
have succeeded in presenting the 
Bible in a Lutheran way. That defi-
ciency the CSB sets out to remedy. 
The CSB is therefore an impor-
tant publication. It represents the 
attempt of its four editors (Robert 
G. Hoerber, General Editor; 
Horace D. Hummel, Walter R. 
Roehrs, Dean 0 . Wenthe, Associate 
Editors) to define in a practical way 
a Lutheran understanding of the 
Bible. At first glance it might seem 
that they have superimposed a Lu-
theran theology upon the Bible; 
where the NSB failed to get Lu-
theran theology out of the Bible, 
here some Lutherans simply 
poured it in from the outside. But 
the Lutheran confession has always 
been that all theology, including its 
own, must be drawn-at least sem-
inally-out of the Bible. 
So the CSB begins with an Intro-
duction in which the editors list six 
doctrines which "govern the in-
terpretations that distinguish this 
edition," but in which they argue 
that these doctrines are not Lu-
theran creations, but grow out of a 
reading of the Scripture. We thus 
find ourselves in the middle of the 
hermeneutical circle: certain "pre-
understandings" govern the in-
terpretation of the Bible, and that 
interpretation in turn reinforces 
the original prior point of view. 
The importance of the CSB, there-
fore, does not lie in its escape from 
the hermeneutical circle; from such 
a circle there is no escape. It lies 
rather in how it seeks to define 
Lutheranism in relation to the 
evangelical theological perspective 
of the NSB. 
The number of editorial altera-
tions which the CSB has made is 
relatively small; and where they 
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have been made, the editors have 
helpfully indicated their revisions 
by means of a dagger. Con-
sequently, it is easy to locate those 
places where change was deemed 
necessary; and by comparing the 
NSB and the CSB at those points it 
is possible to discover what the ed-
itors hold to be a more distinctively 
Lutheran position. 
Predictably, the most obvious 
changes are to be found in the 
notes on sacramental passages. The 
NSB consistently denies to Baptism 
and the Lord's Supper any in-
terpretation as means of grace. So, 
for example, on Titus 3:5 the NSB 
comments on the phrase, "the 
washing of rebirth," as follows: "a 
reference to new birth, of which 
baptism (among other things) is a 
sign. It cannot mean that baptism is 
necessary for regeneration, since 
the New Testament plainly teaches 
that the new birth is an act of 
God's Spirit and is not effected or 
achieved by ceremony." To the 
same phrase the CSB comments: 
"Baptism is a means . .. of our re-
birth, a means through which the 
Holy Spirit produces in us faith as 
a gift of God-all because of God's 
mercy." 
The same holds true for the Sac-
rament of the Altar. For example, 
when Mark 14:22 reports Jesus as 
saying, "This is my body," the NSB 
comments: "The bread represented 
his body, given for them." This the 
CSB has altered to read: "In, with, 
and under the bread we receive 
Christ's body through a sacramen-
tal union." Similarily, on Mark 
14:24 the NSB comments: "the cup 
represents the blood of Jesus, 
which m turn represents his 
poured-out life." The CSB says: 
"In, with, and under the cup we re-
ceive Christ's blood through a sac-
ramental union. Through this sac-
rament, a means of grace, the Holy 
Spirit nourishes faith in believers." 
A second series of modifications 
begins at Revelation 20:2 . This fa-
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mous passage speaks of a 1,000-
year binding of Satan-the millen-
nium. NSB notes three basic ap-
proaches to the passage: a-millen-
nialism, which regards the 1,000 
years as a metaphorical description 
of events more characteristically de-
scribed in the language of the 
Apostles' Creed; and pre-millen-
nialism and post-millennialism, 
both of which attempt to accommo-
date the 1,000 years into a literal 
temporal schema. NSB leaves the 
reader to choose which of the three 
to adopt, thereby reflecting a di-
vided evangelical house on this 
doctrine. 
CSB runs the risk 
of resolving prematurely 
the biblical tension 
between the sovereignty 
and graciousness of God. 
CSB, however, adds a lengthy ar-
gumentation on behalf of a-millen-
nialism. It thereby reflects the Lu-
theran confessional position which 
is averse to speculating about the 
uncertainties of the future end-
time in favor of relying on the ac-
complished work of Christ. The 
echoes of that decision are then 
also heard in passages like I Corin-
thians 15:52, where CSB discour-
ages seeing any reference to a mil-
lennium or to a rapture; and 
Matthew 25:31-46, where the CSB 
note deletes the possibility of a mil-
lennialist interpretation. 
Other revisions, though not so 
obviously dictated by doctrinal con-
victions, nevertheless do evidence 
some subtler doctrinal decisions. In 
the Introduction, where the CSB 
editors list the six principal teach-
ings of Scripture which govern this 
edition, they assign first place to 
the doctrine of the grace of God. It 
is "the thread that runs throughout 
the Scripture and gives unity to all 
the books." While granting that 
"God is holy, just, all-powerful, all-
knowing, and the sovereign ruler 
of the universe ," they give priority 
to the divine attribute of grace. 
That conviction translates into an 
editorial policy which deletes, often 
unnecessarily, notational references 
to the sovereignty of God. So, for 
example, such revisions are made 
repeatedly and surprisingly in Ro-
mans 9, a chapter whose theme is 
the sovereignty of God. Whereas 
the NSB consistently refers to 
God's sovereign right (9 : 15), 
sovereign freedom (9:21) , or God's 
sovereignly grafting (9:25-26), the 
CSB omits the reference to 
sovereignty. Or again, when in the 
introductory essay on Genesis the 
NSB speaks about "God's sovereign 
and gracious intrusion into human 
history," the CSB revises that to 
read , "God's gracious rule m 
human history." 
Such revisions perhaps reflect an 
excess of well-intentioned zeal to 
make the Bible answer too quickly 
Luther's burning question, "How 
shall I find a gracious God?" They 
run the risk of resolving prema-
turely the biblical tension between 
God's sovereignty and God's gra-
ciousness. The CSB editors do bet-
ter by displaying a more balanced 
notion of grace when they provide 
a matrix for grace in "the recurring 
cycle of sin, judgment, and grace," 
and moreover speak of this cycle as 
the principal theme of the Bible. 
This comes closer to the Lutheran 
doctrinal hermeneutical key, 
namely, the tension between God's 
judgment and grace, or, as it is ex-
pressed in the Lutheran Confes-
sions, the distinction between the 
Law and the Gospel. 
Another type of editorial change 
made by the CSB is more difficult 
to attribute to Lutheran Confes-
sional theology and is more related 
to a strong reaction against certain 
features of modern historical con-
sciousness. The CSB shares with 
the NSB a Messianic understanding 
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of the Hebrew Bible, the Christian 
Old Testament. Both the NSB and 
the CSB take the traditional Chris-
tian position that the New Testa-
ment finally reveals the mner 
meaning of the Old Testament, 
and that therefore we may see the 
Old Testament already as replete 
with Messianic predictions ulti-
mately fulfilled in Jesus Christ. 
But the NSB is the more hospi-
table of the two to preliminary, pre-
Messianic interpretations of Old 
Testament passages, drawn from a 
comparison with their contempo-
rary world. The CSB often chooses 
to ignore them in favor of an ex-
clusive and immediate reference to 
Jesus Christ. So, for example, the 
NSB in commenting upon Genesis 
3: 15 speaks of the antagonism be-
tween people and snakes as a sym-
bol of the titanic struggle between 
God and the evil one, a struggle 
played out in the hearts and history 
of mankind with victory finally be-
longing to Christ. The CSB, how-
ever, treats the passage as a direct 
prediction of Christ's victory over 
the devil, without any wider sym-
bolic meaning. 
It is not easy to discern, espe-
cially in the absence of any ar-
gumentation, why such changes 
should be necessary. The NSB's 
pre-Messianic, more widely sym-
bolic interpretation of such a pas-
sage crescendoes to an ultimately 
Messianic interpretation. That 
would seem to be an acceptable 
evangelical understanding of the 
passage, respectful both of the 
older ecclesiastical tradition, as well 
as more modern historical findings. 
But that such interpretation should 
be deleted, or that such a deletion 
is even required by Lutheran theol-
ogy, places a burden of proof upon 
the CSB that it does not discharge. 
In a similar way the CSB tightens 
up a less restrictive interpretation 
which the NSB offers on Psalm 
110. The NSB suggests that in 
composing this Psalm for the coro-
October, 1987 
nation of his son Solompn, David 
"spoke a word that had far larger 
meaning than he knew." The impli-
cation is that the larger meaning 
would be revealed in the later 
events of subsequent generations, 
particularly in Mark 12:35. 
However the CSB says the "N.T. 
seems to require that David, in-
spired by the Spirit, was already 
pointing beyond that preliminary 
application to . . . the Messiah." 
David is thus understood as having 
consciously predicted a Messiah, 
not merely as having unawares spo-
ken more than he consciously 
knew. This is presumably, in the 
view of the editors of the CSB, a 
more Lutheran interpretation of 
the biblical notion of prophecy. 
Again it is not easy to see why 
such an interpretation is to be pre-
ferred, much less required, by Lu-
theran theology. In its comments 
on another passage, Isaiah 7: 14, 
the CSB does offer a double in-
terpretation. When Isaiah spoke of 
Immanuel, he addressed his con-
temporary generation; but the full 
sense of what he had spoken was 
explicated later in Matthew 1:23. 
This interpretive pattern might 
have been employed more consis-
tently, all the more so since it is 
fully compatible with the confes-
sional hermeneutical key of 
Lutheranism in the proper distinc-
tion between the Law and the Gos-
pel. 
The suspicion begins to arise that 
the CSB has the agenda, not 
merely of providing a Lutheran 
version of the NSB, but also of 
publishing a version far more intol-
erant of modern historical and crit-
ical consciousness. That suspicion 
is confirmed through a look, for 
example, at the notes to the phrase, 
"the first day," in Genesis 1:5. The 
NSB si~ply states, "Some say that 
the entation days were 24-hour 
days, o hets that they were indefi-
nite pe 1iods." Again, the NSB does 
not bi d the reader, but allows a 
choice among two options. 
However the CSB removes that 
choice in favor of a literalist, fun-
damentalist interpretation. "The 
first day was reckoned from eve-
ning to morning, according to the 
prevailing custom of the Jews. The 
six days of creation make up a 
period of time equal to Israel's 
work week (Ex. 20:9-11)." Undoubt-
edly ancient Israel and the early 
church so regarded the length of 
the day. That that remains the only 
interpretation for us today is recog-
nizably a very conservative contem-
porary theological position. But 
that that represents in any norma-
tive sense a Lutheran position is a 
highly debatable proposal. 
The plain fact of the matter is 
that the NSB is far more candid in 
confessing a divided evangelical 
house than the CSB is in recogniz-
ing a similarly-divided Lutheran 
house. And the theological fault 
line that runs through both Refor-
mation traditions is a differing 
posture toward modern critical and 
historical thought. There is as yet 
no Lutheran consensus on the 
propriety of historical criticism in 
interpreting the Bible, as the recent 
"Statement of Historical Criticism" 
released by the Lutheran Council 
in the U.S.A. once more docu-
ments. 
The CSB has inherited from the 
NSB an impressively annotated, 
conservative study Bible. And while 
it has at some key points drawn 
upon a commonly acknowledged 
Lutheran doctrinal heritage to 
make it more acceptably Lutheran, 
it neither adequately reflects the 
current spectrum of thinking 
among Lutherans, nor does it con-
vincingly argue its more fundamen-
talist position. But it does thereby 
lend urgency to that important an-
nual question for serious Lutherans 
how heirs of the Reformation can 
best be faithful to their biblical 
heritage under the claims of mod-




This is addressed to my five 
faithful readers (besides Mom, that 
is). I don't want you to be puzzled 
or dismayed next month when you 
turn to the last page of this publi-
cation and you don't find the Last 
Word. It won't be there. 
No, I haven't been fired. (Yet.) 
The editor simply cancelled all reg-
ular columns for November--ex-
cept his own, of course, but hey, 
every job has its perks-with some 
sort of explanation about a fifty 
year anniversary coming only once 
in a lifetime and needing to be 
celebrated in high style. 
He means well, of course, and it 
is sure to be a treasure of an issue. 
I got to peek at the list of guest 
writers, and you will certainly enjoy 
reading them. But another hey; I 
recently observed fifty years of a 
lifetime myself, and I couldn't 
imagine anything more celebratory 
than being surrounded by familiar, 
tried and true friends . Why should 
a magazine be different? 
Anyway, let me take this oppor-
tunity to thank those of you who 
read these humble offerings on a 
more or less regular basis. I am 
confident that there are probably 
five of you, besides Mom, based on 
conversations we have had about 
some of the stuff I have written. 
Why just the other day one of you 
remarked, "Here we are, starting 
another season-what kind of nutty 
ideas are you going to dump on us 
this year?" 
This particular individual got a 
mite crabby upon reading that 
there are a few of us who are not 
enamored of cats and dogs. That is 
probably the column that received 
the most negative reactions of any-
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thing I have ever written. Appar-
ently the whole world owns and 
adores pets, and a good hunk of 
them let me have it for daring to 
suggest otherwise. (On the other 
hand, I got a couple of handshakes 
for being so brave as to speak truly 
about sacred cows and all. Was that 
even a tear in that dear lady's right 
eye, as she explained how she had 
actually suffered for her hostility to 
hamsters and things? My, my.) 
The other piece right up there in 
the not-so-pleasant responses de-
partment had to do with people 
trying to lose weight after New 
Year's-and here I had thought 
that was a universal problem! But 
maybe it just doesn't deserve being 
discussed on the back page, for 
every mail carrier to see. Someone 
might think this is a lightweight rag 
of a journal instead of realizing its 
devotion to stimulating intellectual 
exchange. So I had best keep my 
observations on obesity to myself. 
Perhaps. 
The editor simply 
cancelled all regular 
columns for November-
except his, of course. 
It is true, as another one of you 
five commented, that I seem to 
write about a great many more dis-
likes than likes. But what's a poor 
girl to do when bats constantly 
threaten her life, and February 
shows up on every single calendar 
ever printed? I didn't invent swim-
ming, or eye makeup, or the prac-
tice of referring to the human race 
using terms that sound like they 
apply to only half of it, or the un-
comfortable chairs in doctors' of-
fices , now did I. All I can do is re-
port what goes on around me. 
Sometimes it is intriguing to read 
what comes in the mail. After my 
column on sex a man wrote the ed-
itor taking issue with some of my 
arguments. Now he had some ex-
cellent points to make. But I 
couldn't help thinking that he sup-
ported my general thesis quite well, 
which was that males and females 
tend to think about and react dif-
ferently to many aspects of that 
subject. To be honest, I haven't 
quit cogitating about it myself-the 
eternal fascination, and all that-so 
don't be surprised if it crops up 
again on this page. 
The most positive reactions to 
my writing have come on two dif-
ferent items, both printed else-
where, one serious and one not. 
The first was a little book of 
prayers I composed two decades 
ago that was given away to people 
who listened to a certain religious 
radio broadcast. I don't know this 
for a fact, but someone told me 
that thousands were distributed. 
Anyway, to this day I run into 
people who hear my name and 
then, after a moment's thought, 
will say, "Say, aren't you the one 
who wrote ... ?" That's fun. It was 
also the first piece of writing I ever 
got paid for-not a great deal, but 
a big deal to me at the time, so it 
sticks in my mind. 
The other was a newspaper arti-
cle. In a previous life I did a 
weekly series on community points 
of interest; when I had what 
seemed to be an unusual experi-
ence I wrote it up and submitted it 
to my editor for his critique. He 
ran it as a special feature. It had to 
do with a 1,000 mile trip I took 
with my husband and three chil-
dren age four and under, with 
enough belongings and diapers and 
things for a month, in an old VW 
bug. Now from time to time I have 
been known to "embellish" a fact 
here or there, but in that piece I 
did not make up one single solitary 
bit, and it was, if I do say so my-
self, hilarious. I do not expect to 
ever equal it. 
So, friends, a temporary farewell. 
See you in December. Cl 
The Cresset 
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